CHIUS LIBERATA
OR THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS
BY THE GREEKS IN 1912
AS DESCRIBED IN CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS
AND
CHIOS DURING
THE GREAT WAR

EDITED
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY
PHILIP P. ARGENTI

JOHN LANE
THE BODLEY HEAD LTD.
The third volume which Mr. Philipp Argenti has compiled from contemporary documents on the history of Chios covers the period of the Balkan War and the Great War from 1912 to 1922. Soon after the outbreak of the Balkan War the Greek Government decided to send an expedition under Colonel Delogrammatikas to capture the island of Chios. The expedition was entirely successful and by the middle of December the Turks had been cleared out and the island was finally restored to Greece after a period of over 500 years of unbroken foreign occupation.
BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE MASSACRES OF CHIOS
THE EXPEDITION OF COLONEL FABVIER TO CHIOS

THE BODLEY HEAD
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1933
TO MY DEAR FRIEND

DEMIE PETROCOCHINO
A GREAT CHIAN
AS A SOUVENIR OF
MANY PLEASANT YEARS OF COLLABORATION
IN MATTERS CONNECTED WITH CHIOS
AND AS A TOKEN OF GRATITUDE
IS THIS VOLUME
DEDICATED
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PART I

THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS

BY THE GREEKS IN 1912
INTRODUCTION

THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS
BY THE GREEKS IN 1912

A careful examination must lead to the conclusion that the ultimate objective of any and every policy of the Balkan States during the nineteenth century had always been in some way to reduce Turkish ascendancy in south-eastern Europe. On more than one occasion a Balkan Union had been the idea of the moment; but, owing to political and racial jealousies among these States, such a Union had never materialized. These jealousies were carefully nurtured and embittered by Austria and Turkey, who had every interest in their perpetuation.

Early in 1911 the initiative came from Athens. Indirectly and with the greatest secrecy proposals were transmitted to Sofia for the formation of an offensive alliance against Turkey. The Bulgarian Government at first distrusted the Greek offer, but, realizing the moment for action to be opportune, initiated negotiations in Vienna with the Serbian representatives. These pourparlers were destined to have a most satisfactory issue, and on the 13th March 1912 a Treaty of Alliance was signed between the two States. Simultaneously, official negotiations were now opened in Sofia between the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, who signed a secret treaty on the 29th May 1912. Montenegro also made arrangements for participation with Greece and Bulgaria, and finally signed the treaty with Serbia in September of the same year.

The Allies at once began to mobilize, and sent a joint ultimatum to the Porte, demanding immediate
application of reforms. On the 8th October Montenegro openly declared war.

The European Powers were really divided in face of this situation. Russia was ready to fish in the troubled waters of a Balkan War, in order to open the Straits, but had not enough support from her ally France or her new friend England. Austria and Italy were intent on keeping Serbia out of the Adriatic. Germany did not wish to be dragged into war over a Balkan crisis to save Austrian interests, or possibly still held Bismarck’s view that intervention in the Eastern question ‘was not worth risking the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier’. England and France were unwilling to promote Russian desires. All parties (excepting Russia) feared a change of equilibrium. Russia was also well aware of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and was anxious to be its patron; but, finding little encouragement in France and England, she joined ultimately with Austria, on behalf of the other Powers, in jointly informing the Balkan States that, whatever the issue of the war, the territorial status quo would be enforced. But this warning was not presented until the 7th October.

The Balkan States appear to have been convinced that this intervention of the Great Powers was not the external manifestation of their real sympathies, but was due to their conviction that only an overwhelming Turkish victory could be the outcome of the conflict: in this case the European Chanceries would conveniently have been from the beginning on the side of the victors and could thus more easily secure advantageous solutions of many impending matters, not excluding concessions, in which they had direct interests. Possibly the Entente Powers wished to prove to Turkey that they were also friends of Islam with a view to neutralizing German influence at Constantinople, or possibly they foresaw the Great War and remembered Aesop’s fable of the Lion and the Mouse. The Balkan States, in pursuing this line of thought, were inevitably led to the conclusion that, if on the other hand they were the victors, the Great Powers would not lack souplesse in changing front in the face of accomplished facts. They thus discounted, in advance, Mr. Asquith’s benevolent and philanthropic announcement of the 9th November, ‘that the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear’.

Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the undercurrents of European diplomacy, the Balkan States wasted no time in joining Montenegro, who had already declared war; on the 13th October they sent notes to Austria and Russia and also to the Porte, in which they formulated a demand, among others, for the autonomy of European Turkey. The Porte, indignant at such insolence, proudly recalled her representatives from Belgrade and Sofia, and on the 17th October declared war on these two neighbours. The whole peninsula was thus ablaze.

Lightning successes followed all the enterprises undertaken by the Greeks. Their army marched northward, overwhelming the superior Turkish forces at every encounter. These victories culminated in the Battle of Sarantaporon on the 22nd October and that of Jenitsa on the 1st–2nd November. On the 8th November the Greek army entered Salonika, one of the great centres of Grecia Irredenta.

A few days before the victorious entry of the Greek troops into Salonika under the then Crown Prince (Diadoch) Constantine, the latter sent an order to General Constantine Kallaris, the officer in command of the 2nd Division, ordering him to organize an expedition for the capture of Chios. On the 6th
November, 1912, at 8 p.m., General Kallaris sent to the officers in command of the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiments, and of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, instructions to have in readiness two battalions of the 1st Regiment and one battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment, to proceed with full equipment. These three battalions were to constitute a full regiment under the command of Colonel Delagrammatikas, under whose orders was placed also a battery of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery.¹

Two hours after receipt of these instructions the whole Expedient Force was in complete readiness and awaiting marching orders. On the 7th November, however, the above order was modified, so that the 7th Infantry Regiment provided two battalions, and the 1st Regiment only one.² This latter order in no way modified the composition of the Expedient Force; it was solely due to administrative requirements. On the 8th November, at 4 p.m., the officer in command of the Expedient Force received instructions from his superior, the general in command of the 2nd Division, to embark the Expedient Force upon the s.s. Patris and Sappho.³ Following this order the whole force left Salonika Barracks at 5 p.m., with the exception of the Battery of Field Artillery, which remained behind. At 6 p.m. this force was drawn up at the Docks, but owing to adverse weather the actual embarkation was not effected until 8.15 a.m.

¹ General Constantine Kallaris' order to the officers commanding the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, dated Salonika, 6th November 1912, No. 599. [See page 3.]
² General Constantine Kallaris' order to the officers commanding the 1st and 7th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, dated Salonika, 7th November 1912, No. 601. [See page 3.]
³ General Constantine Kallaris' order to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, officer commanding the Chios Expedient Force, dated Salonika, 8th November 1912, No. 607. [See page 4.]

of the following day, the 9th November, when the first ship sailed out of the harbour. At 8.15 a.m. on the 10th November the two ships reached the harbour of Mytilene, where a detachment of the Greek Fleet lay at anchor. At 3 p.m. Colonel Delagrammatikas, together with his adjutant, went on board the flagship Hesperia to confer with Captain Damianò. It was decided that the whole force should leave Mytilene at midnight on the 10th November, and with the support of the Fleet make an attempt to land at Chios. Captain Damianò also handed to Colonel Delagrammatikas a telegraphic order from the Ministry of Marine, addressed to the Harbour Master of Salonika, ordering the troops to embark on the s.s. Patris and Sappho, and giving instructions to head for the harbour of Chios Town at full speed. Until the landing had been effected the troops were to be under the command of the Senior Naval Officer, Captain Damianò.¹ Captain Damianò at the same time informed Colonel Delagrammatikas of the instructions, which the Harbour Master had passed on to him from the Minister of Marine, and by which he was ordered to sail as quickly as possible for their destination, a pilot being placed at his disposal to take his ship out of Salonika Harbour.²

On the 11th November, at 10 a.m., the Division of Auxiliary Cruisers and the Patris and Sappho, which were conveying the landing force, under the immediate command of Squadron Commander Damianò, anchored before Chios Town, and after making a demonstration they moored outside the harbour. A

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of Marine, Athens, to the Harbour Master of Salonika, No. 1490. [See page 4.]
² The order of the Harbour Master of Salonika, Sakkalis, to the commanding officer of the s.s. Patris, dated Salonika, 9th November 1912, No. 5960. [See pages 4 and 5.]
deputation, representing the officers commanding the Fleet and the Army, consisting of Lieut.-Commander Chazikyriakos, and Lieut. Stephan Tryphou, landed and proceeded to the Government House, where they met the Turkish civil and military authorities of the island. Lieut.-Commander Chazikyriakos demanded that the island be immediately surrendered to the Greek forces, and that the Turkish Army should capitulate and hand over all ammunition and armaments within a definitely stated period, requiring an immediate reply to his summons. The civilian authorities, knowing that their position was hopeless and not wishing to expose the Turkish civilian population to destruction, decided to accept the Greek ultimatum. But the military commandant, Zichny Bey, refused to conform to such a decision, and announced that it was his intention to resist to the end and thus save the honour of the Turkish Army. This was undoubtedly a very courageous attitude, for the Greek Fleet under Admiral Couourdouriotis had successfully blockaded the Dardanelles and thus paralysed the Turkish Fleet, which, with the exception of one or two ships, was shut into the Sea of Marmora. The position, therefore, of the Turkish Army at Chios in 1912 was almost identical with that of the Greek population of the island in 1822 during the raid of the Samians, which resulted in the massacre of the islanders. That massacre was due to the fact that the Greek Navy, during the War of Independence, had not command of the Aegean. These facts were known to Zichny Bey before he made his bold decision; and, owing to the fact that he had lived in Chios for some time, he was fully aware that hatred rankled in the hearts of the Greek population who might now justifiably seek to avenge the cruelties of 1822.

After this declaration of the Turkish military com-

mander, the Turkish civilian authorities had no other alternative than to comply with Zichny Bey's orders. At the same time, however, they sent a deputation consisting of the Orthodox Archbishop Hieronymos, the Mayor Nicholas Kouvelà, Constantine Ladopoulos, Fouà Bey, and two other Turks, who proceeded on board the Hesperia to communicate to Captain Damianò and to Colonel Delagrammatikas their refusal to accept the ultimatum. They pointed out to the Greek Commanders that the island was not fortified and in accordance with International Law should be deemed to be outside the area of hostilities, and that in the event of a forced landing, or of attack, the Turkish Army would resist in accordance with the strict orders which had been received, and that then the destruction of the town would be inevitable.

To these diplomatic subtilties the Greek Commanders answered by a tu quoque, stating that they also had categorical orders from their superiors to occupy the island at whatever cost, and that consequently the responsibility for any destruction or bloodshed would devolve upon the Turkish authorities. They agreed, however, to a short prolongation of the period fixed for the surrender.

Shortly after the departure of the deputation from the flagship, the foreign Consuls, at the request of the Turkish Governor, went on board the Hesperia and requested the Greek Commanders to do their utmost to spare the town and not to bombard it. The Greek officers agreed not to attack the town, and undertook to land their forces at some other point on the island.

After the departure of the Consuls the Turkish authorities sent a written protest, repeating their arguments and underlining the fact that Chios was not a fortified island. After this démarche they retired to the interior and the Greek Fleet proceeded to the south.
INTRODUCTION

The Expeditionary Force was composed of 74 Army officers and 1,365 men besides 2 officers of the Marines with 80 marines. The Turkish Force, including the Gendarmerie, consisted of 2,500 men, 1 platoon of Cavalry, and 2 batteries of Mounted Artillery which were disposed in the following way:

1. In the town of Chios . . . . . . 900 men
2. At Vrondado . . . . . . 100 "
3. At monastery of Aghios Markos . . . . . . 200 "
4. At Kondari . . . . . . 240 "
5. At Amythounda . . . . . . 400 "
6. At Volissós . . . . . . 60 "
7. At Kardamyla . . . . . . 60 "
8. Dispersed in the various villages . . . . . . 500 "

with the relative complement of officers.

Kondari was selected by the Greek Commanders as being the point on the island where a landing could be most easily effected. As soon as the Turks in the town had been apprised of this decision, 900 men, together with their officers, were rushed from Chios Town to reinforce the garrison at Kondari. The Greek landing, therefore, met with stubborn resistance. The landing was to take place at 3 p.m., and the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces issued instructions to the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment, and to those in command of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Regiment, as well as to the Mountain Artillery, that the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment was to be the first unit to land, and that the first Company to reach the shore was to advance and establish contact with the enemy, in order to cover as much as possible the landing of the other troops. After the landing of the whole battalion they were to advance inland and take up positions to cover the landing of the battalion of the

7th Regiment, as well as that of the Mountain Artillery. ¹

At 3.15 p.m. the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment began to land from the s.s. Patris. This was followed by a machine-gun battery and the remaining three companies of the same battalion. As soon as the 9th Company came within range the enemy opened fire simultaneously from all their entrenchments, and were supported by a heavy artillery bombardment. This, however, in no way caused the boats to slacken their speed, but on the contrary caused the troops to be all the more eager to hasten to reinforce their comrades.

At the same time the officer in command of the Naval Squadron gave the signal to open fire. The repercussion of this gun-fire was tremendous, for, owing to the natural conformation of the ground, every detonation was echoed and re-echoed in the overhanging mountains beyond. The bombardment continued until the Turkish entrenchments had been completely destroyed and the enemy in panic took to the mountains. In the meantime the landing of the remaining forces continued, and already by 5.30 p.m. half the Expeditionary Force had set foot on the island. At this juncture the colonel in command sent a wireless message to the Ministry of War and to His Royal Highness the Diadoch, reporting the unsatisfactory outcome of the previous negotiations and also the subsequent landing, which had been effected successfully and was continuing unimpeded. ²

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to the officers commanding the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 7th Regiment, and the Mountain Artillery, dated Kondari Bay, 11th November 1912, 2.50 p.m. [See page 5.]

² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Dispatch to the Ministry of War, Athens, and to H.R.H. the Diadoch, Salonika, dated 'On board the s.s. Patris, 11th November 1912, 5.10 p.m.' [See page 6.]
INTRODUCTION

The march actually began at 7 a.m. and the capital of the island was entered by 8 a.m. As instructed, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, together with a machine-gun platoon, proceeded to the north-west of the town and took up their position at Aghios Demetrios, where advance guards were established in order to watch the enemy's movements at Karyès and the monastery of Aghios Markos.

The population of the town went mad with joy. They rang church bells. They sang Christos Anesti and Anastaseos Himera. They strewed the streets with flowers, and from the windows they rained down roses and rice upon the soldiers.

Shortly after the occupation of the town, Colonel Delagrammatikas installed himself in the offices of the Military Governor. He then issued a Proclamation in the name of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, declaring the island occupied by Greece and calling upon the inhabitants to submit, promising them protection and safety without any distinction of race or creed.1

The Ministry of War was also informed of this Proclamation and of the occupation of the town.2

Immediately following the Proclamation all the local authorities presented themselves before the Commander of the Forces of Occupation and took the oath of allegiance to His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, as the representatives and in the name of all the inhabitants of the island. A Thanksgiving Service in the Orthodox Cathedral immediately followed and the Greek flag was hoisted over the house of the Military Governor.

the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, Captain Papakyriazis, dated Kondari, 12th November 1912, 5.20 a.m. [See page 7.]

1 Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Order to all units under his command, dated Kondari, 12th November 1912, 5 p.m. [See page 6.]
2 Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' Dispatch to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 12th November 1912, 8.45 a.m. [See page 8.]
INTRODUCTION

To return to the military situation. At 2 p.m. the Turkish forces at Karyès, and at the monastery of Aghios Markos, opened both rifle and artillery fire against the advance pickets at Aghios Demetrios, which was held by the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment. Owing to the fact that the Turkish forces were occupying the higher ground, it was clear that the advance picket would in time be forced to give up their positions, as they were unable to return the fire effectively. Consequently the Commander of the Forces of Occupation ordered six companies and the artillery battery to advance and attack the enemy. The encounter lasted until the evening, when finally the Greek forces succeeded in driving the enemy into the rocky heights of Mount Piganios, to Nea Moni, and the monastery of Aghión Paterón.

The day of the 13th November passed off in comparative calm with the exception of the bombardment of advance pickets at Karyès. At 5 p.m. Captain Kouvelis reported to head-quarters that, although the enemy on the heights commanding Karyès were numbers, their positions were quite inaccessible and impregnable, and that, if Karyès was to be occupied by Greek forces, the safest course to adopt would be to send another unit against their north flank, which could easily expel them from their positions owing to the fact that the attack could be made from places situated almost on the same level.\(^1\) At 10 p.m. of the same day the Commander of the Troops of Occupation received definite instructions from the Minister of War ‘to pursue the Turks until they were defeated and forced to surrender’.\(^2\)

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1 Captain Aristides Kouvelis’ report to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated the 13th November 1912. [See page 8.]
2 Eleftherios Venizelos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 13th November 1912. [See page 9.]
against the enemy at the present juncture was most ill-advised and would inevitably result in very severe losses. He therefore decided to occupy all the harbours and the inhabited regions round the enemy, and thus not only to encircle his opponent, but also to confine him to the rugged and unfertile area of the island and so force him to surrender. With this objective the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was sent to Aghios Georgios with orders to occupy the village of Daphnoma and thus cut off the enemy forces at the monasteries of Aghios Markos and Nea Moni from their supply centres. This order was successfully carried out on the very same day.

The 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment received orders to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment at Karyes and to proceed to the occupation of the monastery of Aghios Markos. This operation was attempted twice in the morning of the 15th, but did not meet with any success, and the officer in command reported his failure to the Commander of the Forces, adding that twenty-five men posted at the monastery of Aghios Markos were quite sufficient to keep a whole legion at bay.¹

At this point a short digression from the narrative of the military operations may be considered relevant. It may be difficult for anybody who is not familiar with the very peculiar formation of the ground to understand why such insurmountable difficulties presented themselves to the Greek forces. Immediately to the north of Karyes the plain continues along the seashore as far as Vrondado. Within approximately three-quarters of a mile of the shore the ground suddenly rises abruptly to such an extent that even to-day the road, which is to connect Chios Town with the

¹ Captain Aristeides Kouvelis’ report to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated 15th November 1912. [See page 9.]
Map of
ISLAND OF CHIOS

Illustrating
Military Operations 1912.

Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Chios
Smyrna

KASTRON (CHIOS)
second largest town of the island, Volissos, remains unfinished, although the work was actually begun some years ago and is still being continued. It is therefore obvious that a very small force in possession of a such a plateau or tableland entirely commands all the roads from the south of the island and from the town, and would be sufficient to hold in check very superior numbers. The monasteries of Aghios Markos and Nea Moni are also strongholds in themselves, being constructed upon lofty and rugged peaks. It is consequently easily comprehensible that the only means of clearing the island of the enemy without incurring very heavy casualties was by starvation. The enemy would thus be obliged to withdraw to the natural strongholds, but had to face the unpleasant fact that these were situated in an almost barren and deserted district, and, if confined to such regions, they would inevitably be forced to capitulate.

At 1 p.m. on the 15th November, Captain Kouvelis attempted the ascent from Karyes. After four and a half hours' fighting the Greek troops were compelled to retire. As it was impossible for the advance guard of Karyes to make a frontal attack upon the enemy without incurring disproportionate casualties, it was decided to attempt the capture of the heights of the Aepos and those to the north of Aghios Georgios, as well as of those which commanded the monastery of Aghiôn Paterôn, by a surprise attack at night. This operation was entrusted to the 9th Company of the Machine Gun Platoon and to the Naval Detachment, these troops being placed under the command of Captain Kouvelis. At 4 a.m. the attack was begun and the Greek troops succeeded in reaching the top of the ridge and in capturing the Turkish outposts, who were asleep. The officer in command of the Naval Detachment, without having received specific
orders, apparently allowed his enthusiasm to carry him away and directed his men to the left flank of the advancing Company and thus quickly reached the top of the ridge. He then gave the order to advance. He considered this to be the only method to unmask the enemy, who held positions of great natural strength, and to drive him into the interior. The Commander of the Company, having reconnoitred, was persuaded that the enemy were possessed of superior forces and gave instructions to the Naval Detachment not to continue their advance, pointing out that in accordance with the order issued by the Commander of the Forces of Occupation, the advance was only to be continued if strong resistance was not encountered. Captain Kouvelis reported to the Commander of the Forces of Occupation, requesting immediate dispatch of reinforcements. The officer in command of the Naval Detachment again allowed his enthusiasm to get the better of his sense of discipline, apparently having the idea that the enemy's forces were not considerable, and ordered his detachment to advance once more on the left flank, in order to attack the enemy and cut off his retreat.

Soon after this new advance, the Naval Detachment came to hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy and succeeded in forcing him to abandon his position. After their success the Naval Detachment continued their advance and conceived the plan of occupying the ridge of hills from which they could command the enemy, and hoped thus to be in a position to protect the operations of the infantry units. At the same time, however, their commander informed the Company Commander that after executing this manœuvre he would maintain himself on the defensive upon the ridge. However, before he was able to complete this manœuvre he found himself between three fires. A sharp encounter then ensued against very superior enemy forces, and would have been disastrous to the Naval Detachment had not the 9th Company hastened in time to its relief. The 11th Company of the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 2nd and 12th Companies of the 7th Regiment also rushed to the rescue, and succeeded in extracting the Naval Detachment from the ambush into which they had been lured and had dashed headlong. In this way the plateau of Aepos was captured.

Zichny Bey, after this reverse on Aepos, decided to attack the Greeks from another direction. On the 16th November the Turkish advance guard at the village of Pytiós proceeded to attack the Greek volunteer corps, which occupied the heights of Grià, with the object of seizing the town of Kardamyla. The Turks advanced from Karphotós (Pytiós) at midday and stormed the heights of Grià. After a very sharp engagement the Turkish troops proved unable to dislodge the Greek volunteers from their positions. The engagement lasted until 5 p.m.

Possibly the presence of a volunteer corps calls for some explanation. In the early part of 1912 a volunteer corps had been organized at Kardamyla with the object of resisting any attempt at landing by Italian troops, which Austrian intervention alone prevented as is disclosed by Baron Sonnino. The formation was carried out with the greatest possible secrecy, and this organization was utilized as the nucleus for other similar formations, which, before the Greek landing, had as their object a revolution in Chios and so the annexation of the island either to Crete or to the Dodekanese. There were rumours at that
time that the Dodekanese was to be declared independent by the Great Powers. These volunteer corps were chiefly maintained by private individuals.

An unsuccessful attempt was also made to capture the heights of Aghiōn Paterōn. The Commander of the Forces of Occupation, after receiving fuller reports of the various operations, was convinced that it was quite impossible with the forces at his disposal to advance against the enemy without incurring altogether disproportionate casualties, and decided to request the Ministry of War to send reinforcements immediately. He requested the dispatch of one complete regiment and a machine-gun company. He reported that the Turkish forces amounted to two thousand two hundred, had at their disposal heavy artillery, occupied inaccessible positions, and were fighting with guerrilla tactics. He also added that they knew nothing of the events in European Turkey, and their morale was excellent.¹

On the 17th November the Minister of War telegraphed orders to use some other means to attain the desired objective without incurring great casualties, and that, if necessary, a landing at some other point of the island should be effected by arrangement with the Admiral in command of the Cruiser Squadron.² It certainly seems difficult to understand the reason for this reply; if the Officer commanding the Forces of Occupation had not in his own estimation sufficient forces and so had requested the dispatch of reinforcements, how would it be possible for him without reinforcements to carry out a landing at some other point of the island, since this would mean the dispersion of his present strength and consequently a weakening of his line? It is still less easy to comprehend, with the limited material at our disposal, what was, or rather could be, the other means to attain the desired objective without incurring great casualties.

On the 18th November the Commander of the Forces of Occupation agreed to undertake a landing at Volissos. The s.s. Macedonia proceeded to the Gulf of Volissos and bombarded the monastery of Moundon where, according to information received, the enemy forces had been concentrated. At the same time a naval detachment was landed and proceeded to the above monastery and succeeded in taking prisoners the Turkish contingent which had been stationed there. A volunteer corps was formed at Volissos, where it was armed and trained.

From this date it was clear that Zichny Bey would be forced to surrender. He was completely surrounded by land and blockaded by sea; seeing the town of Volissos fallen into the hands of the Greeks, the capture of the detachment which had hitherto been stationed at the monastery of Moundon, the failure of his troops against the volunteer corps, and his consequent failure to reach Kardamyla, the Turkish Commander in desperation issued an order to the main body of his troops of the Aepos to make a surprise attack against the Greek outpost pickets, who had only just reached the fringe of the plateau. On the 18th November the enemy attacked in full force. The Greek advance-guard's pickets had, however, been reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and succeeded not only in sustaining the attack, but in forcing the enemy to retreat with comparatively heavy losses.

In addition to the volunteer corps at Volissos, the

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 16th November 1912, No. 269. [See page 9.]
² Eleftherios Venizelos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 17th November 1912, No. 94117. [See page 10.]
he communicated this decision to the Ministry of War in Athens, and underlined the fact that, in this way, the Greek troops were maintained in good condition and without casualties, whereas the enemy was confined to the mountainous district and was deprived of all means of getting supplies. The Navy, at the same time, kept a strict blockade by sea, and in the majority of the outlying villages volunteer corps had been organized.¹

In accordance with the above plan steps were taken to re-form the front line, and by the 23rd November all the advance-guard pickets had taken up their new positions. On that day the troops were reinforced by the arrival of a battery of mountain artillery and also by a corps of volunteers which proceeded to Lithi.

On the 24th November at 9 a.m. the Turkish Commander realized that the Greek troops had withdrawn from the southern fringe of the Aepos plateau and from the heights; the Turkish troops proceeded to bombard Vrontado. They were, however, very surprised to be themselves in turn bombarded by the heavy guns of the Fleet and retreated almost at once.

On the 29th November the Admiral in command of the Greek Fleet sent an urgent telegram from Moudros requesting information on the situation,² and Colonel Delagrammatikas replied informing him of the suspension of operations and of the maintenance of the blockade of the Turkish forces in the plateau of Aepos.³ A detachment of Cretan volunteers, who

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas’ report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated 21st November 1912, No. 334. [See pages 10 and 11.]
² The Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, Paul Coundouriotes, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Moudros, 29th November 1912, No. 1217. [See page 11.]
³ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas’ telegram to the Admiral Commanding the Greek Fleet, Paul Coundouriotes, dated Chios, 29th November 1912, No. 425. [See page 11.]
during the Balkan Wars had carried all in front of them, had been sent to Chios, and it was apparently expected that their mere presence would immediately frighten the Turks into surrender, for shortly after their arrival busybodies in Athens became impatient owing to the protracted nature of the military operations in the island, and these presumably brought pressure to bear upon the Ministers of War and Marine. Probably it was at their instigation that the Minister of Marine sent a telegraphic order to Colonel Delagrammatikas enjoining him to advance without delay against the main body of Turkish troops and to wipe them out, in co-operation with the officer in command of the Naval Forces. This the Minister considered particularly desirable, as a general armistice was expected to be concluded by the end of that week. The Minister also added that with the addition of the Cretan volunteer corps the numbers of the Expeditionary Force had thus been increased to four thousand and were therefore numerically double in strength to the enemy.¹

The colonel in command immediately replied to the Ministry that, owing to the enemy positions being very strongly fortified and inaccessible, the execution of his order would entail very heavy casualties, and that the result of such a general engagement was very doubtful: that the enemy positions had been carefully chosen and organized for defence for over one year and had been prepared to resist an Italian occupation: that no roads existed: that there were only paths so that the troops would have to advance in single file: that owing to casualties and illness the strength of the Regiment had been reduced to two thousand one hundred: and that the recent dispatch of nine hundred

¹ Nicholas Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, No. 94504. [See page 12.]

and fifty untrained men had in no way increased the fighting capacity of the troops under his command. The Colonel also informed the Ministry that only one ship remained in the neighbouring waters and that he was submitting a detailed report, which was being sent by special messenger.¹

In the detailed dispatch the Colonel reported that the enemy's forces amounted to two thousand three hundred, and that these forces occupied the precipitous mountain peaks situated in the north part of the island, the majority of which were out of range, and that, owing to their natural formation, a handful of men was sufficient to maintain not only the positions themselves, but also all the converging approaches; that the Greek forces amounted to two thousand one hundred, three battalions of which occupied the line from Aghios Georgios to Vrondado (the fourth being in reserve), that the north-western part of the island was occupied by the Cretans and the various volunteer corps and that thus the enemy was entirely encircled and confined to a region which only contained three villages from which he could draw supplies. It was consequently obvious that a decisive attack against positions of this character, which had been very efficiently organized for defence, could not be undertaken with any great hopes of success, but that on the contrary heavy losses were certain and that the result could not be the isolation of the enemy to one locality. This would require a far larger force; even if it were possible to expel the enemy from these positions and to occupy them with small detachments, the advancing sections would be exposed to fire from all sides and would run the risk of being surrounded. Another important factor was that the Greek troops could not

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to the Minister of War, Athens, No. 430. [See pages 12 and 13.]
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be utilized as a whole body for co-operation from the same spot, owing to the conformation of the ground and the complete lack of roads. It was consequently obvious that if such an attack were made and the Turks succeeded in breaking the iron ring which had been placed round them, the advantages hitherto gained would have been seriously endangered. The Colonel also informed the Minister that the bearer of the present dispatch was in a position to provide him with any supplementary information.¹

In the meanwhile Zichny Bey was receiving signals from the Asiatic shore that the Turkish arms had been successful in the other theatres of war. He consequently made up his mind to rival the successes of his comrades. He therefore ordered a general attack to be made on the 29th November against the advance pickets of the Greek army which were stationed round the edge of the Aepos plateau.

The enemy attacked in the early morning from the direction of Mount Piganios and the monastery of Aghios Markos. They had as their objective the Greek positions at Karyes. The Turkish detachments from Nea Moni and Aghiotes Pateron, and from Mount Provation descended and attacked the volunteer corps at Paphlidi, and the positions at Aghios Georgios and Lithi. A very obstinate engagement was fought, and only at 4.30 p.m. did the Greek forces succeed in repulsing the attack and forcing the enemy to retire in disorder to the mountains. The losses of the Turkish forces in this engagement were sufficient to persuade Zichny Bey that the information which was being flashed from Tchesmé and other points on the coast of Asia Minor was not altogether accurate, and consequently that from now onwards it was
desirable to his advantage to confine his activities to guerrilla warfare.

The result of this successful engagement was immediately reported to the Greek Ministry of War, who had in the meantime received the report sent by special messenger. The Minister telegraphed acknowledging receipt of the report and definitely cancelled his previous order for a general attack.¹

The following fortnight was marked by no important event, although the troops in the front line fought a number of minor skirmishes. On the 16th December a staff Captain Eleftherios Vernardos arrived at Chios bearing a dispatch from His Royal Highness, the Diadoch Constantine, who was in supreme command of the Greek Army, informing Colonel Delagrammatikas that the bearer of the dispatch would communicate the views of the generalissimo upon the operations in Chios and that this officer was in future to act as liaison between him and the supreme command.²

During the last few days some reinforcements and ammunition had arrived from Mytilene, following instructions from the Ministry of War in Athens. The Turkish population of the capital had consequently begun to get very uneasy, seeing that the Greeks were determined at all costs to bring the operations at Chios to a successful end. They also realized that from a strategic point of view, Zichny Bey's position was quite untenable and that it was merely a question of time before the whole Turkish force would be forced to capitulate; it was also not absent from their minds

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas dated 30th November 1912, No. 94514. [See pages 14 and 15.]
² His Royal Highness, Constantine Diadoch, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Hellenic Army to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, dated Salonika, 29th November 1912, No. 1474. [See page 15.]
that the Greek population might seize this opportunity to avenge upon them the massacres of 1822 and thus visit the sins of the fathers upon the children. Owing to these opinions, or rather convictions, the three most prominent members of the Turkish population, namely, Asim Bey, Nouri Bey, and Nail Bey, obtained leave from the Commander of the Greek Forces of Occupation to send a letter to Zichny Bey, in which they pointed out the hopeless situation of the Turkish forces and begged him to receive a deputation to discuss on what grounds he would be prepared to negotiate. In answer to this communication, Zichny Bey replied:

Monday, 17th December 1912, European hour 10.30.

To the Notables of the Island, ASIM BEY, NOURI BEY, and NAIL BEY,

I have just received the letter which you sent by Akil Bey. In accordance with your declaration I am ready to discuss matters with the members of the deputation, which may come to-morrow at mid-day to the Monastery of Aghion Pateron.

The Military Governor of Chios.

ZICHTY.¹

On the following day a deputation of Turkish notables proceeded to the monastery of Aghion Pateron to confer with Zichny Bey. After a long and protracted discussion he dismissed them with the Spartan reply, 'Let them come and take' (Μολὼν λαβέ).

As soon as the result of the negotiations was made known to the Greek authorities, they decided to wait no longer but to make the general attack at once.

On the morning of the 18th, Major Michael Kotoula, in command of a company, left for the village of Viki. At the same time the officer commanding the Troops of Occupation issued to the commanders of all units the following order:

ORDER OF THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION

1. The enemy forces, according to our information, number from 1,500 to 1,800, and are concentrated in an open space stretching from Mount Pilinaios and the heights situated to the north and north-east of the villages of Pytiòs; they occupy all the peaks situated to the south of this line as far as the range of Vroulià. The largest concentration of troops is on the heights from Apeos to Amythouda.

2. The Troops of Occupation will attack on the 19th of December in close collaboration with the volunteer forces and of the Fleet.

3. The unit of Paparodos, consisting of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment, four guns and the volunteer corps under Sub-lieutenant Lopi, together with a squad, will attack in the direction of Vroulià, Salikouvou, and Koumarì, towards Mount Provation; the Lopi unit will attack from the line Lepròu–Avgonyma towards the line Salikouvou–Koumarì.

The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th of December.

To-night you will send a liaison officer to my headquarters. The Fleet from the Bay of Lithi will assist the advance by bombarding Mount Provation and the heights situated to the south.

4. Two Companies of the reserve-depôt Battalions under Major Papadimitriou, under whose orders the volunteer corps of Paphilida will be placed, will hold during the morning of the 19th the line Aghios Ioannis–Karyès–Paphilida. As soon as the enemy's line is pressed by the attack of the main body they will attack, having as their

¹ This is a translation of the Greek text published by Peter G. Karakassonis, the original of which was written presumably in Turkish and is not available. Consequently, it is not reproduced amongst the official dispatches.
objective the line Aghios Markos to the monastery of Aghiōn Paterón.

5. The main body will consist of the Battalions Zerva, Kouveli, Manousaki, of the Company of Evzones and of the Artillery, which will advance as follows:

(a) The Zerva Battalion at Vrondado, together with two machine-guns, will move off at 6.30 a.m., following the high road towards Epos. Its objective being the capture of the hills, which it held before the retirement, as soon as they attain their objective they will await further orders. This advance will be supported by the Fleet.

(b) The remaining units will proceed according to the aforesaid order of march, the artillery following the Battalion of Kouveli at 6.30 a.m. from the town of Chios, and make for Vrondado, where they will await further orders.

The battalion transports will follow in the rear of their respective battalions according to the order of march, and will halt facing the road leading out of the village of North Vrondado, facing Aepos, where they will await further orders.

6. The two companies of Plastira at Langada, together with the volunteer corps, will head for the occupation of the heights Sarakina–Siderika. The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December.

7. The mixed section of regular troops and volunteer corps under Warrant-Officer Starida, which is at Kardamyla, will arrange to occupy the heights, Karpáthos, opposite the village of Pytios and will commence the attack not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December. The advance will be supported by the Fleet.

8. One company of the reserve-depot Battalion under Major Kotoula will land to-day, the 18th December, in the Bey of Viki. This company, together with the volunteer corps, which is at Viki and Amades under Emiri Tzortzaki, Phiotaki, and Pritzolaki, will place themselves under the orders of Major Kotoula and will move off from Viki, with its objective the capture of Kritikolakós and of the heights dominating Amythounda. The attack will begin not later than 7 a.m. on the 19th December.

9. The mixed force of Gavathà at Volissós consisting of regulars and volunteers (Ikarians, Cretans, and inhabitants of Volissós) will advance via Kavatas, with its objective the occupation of the heights situated to the west of Aghios Isidoros, and will afterwards advance to Oros, as soon as they see the main body advancing to the north.

10. The ammunition column will take up station at the village of South Vrondado.

11. I will march with the main body. Intelligence to be sent to Vrondado from 7.30 a.m. of the 19th December.

Chios, 18th December 1912.

N. Delagrammatikas,
Officer Commanding the Troops of Occupation.¹

Immediately after signature the above order was sent to the officers in command of all units and was received by them before midday of the 18th December.

At 3 p.m. on the 18th December, Major Pappadimitriou, the Officer in Command of the Outposts at Karyès, reported to Colonel Delagrammatikas that Major Housein Bey and Lieut. Enver Effendi, both officers in the Turkish Army, had approached his lines bearing a white flag, and had stated that they had been sent by the Commander of the Turkish troops in order to negotiate in his name the terms of surrender.

Colonel Delagrammatikas immediately sent Captains Kouvelis and Vernardos to Karyès to meet them. He

¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to all officers commanding units under his command, dated Chios, 18th December, 1912. [See pages 15-18.]
himself, together with his adjutant, remained in the church of Aghios Demetrios to await the outcome of the negotiations. At 6.30 p.m. the officers returned and reported that the Turkish representatives were not in possession of clear and definite instructions, and as they did not know whether the terms would be acceptable to the Commander of the Turkish troops they requested that another meeting should take place on the same spot on the following day, the 19th December, promising to bring the definite decision of their chief. Although the outcome of these attempted negotiations in no way improved the situation, the Commander of the Greek forces decided to postpone the order of attack in the hope of thus sparing his troops any unnecessary casualties, and issued instructions to this effect. He ordered all commanders to await further orders, and in the meantime, to stand by and hold their present positions.¹

At the same time the officer in command reported to the Ministry of War in Athens, apprising it of the details of the situation, and asking for instructions as to what terms he should accept, and especially whether the Turkish troops should be allowed to retain their arms and be transported to Asia Minor.² On the 19th December, the Turkish officers, who had been empowered to negotiate, arrived at Karyés and produced their credentials.³

They were met by the Greek officers who had also been previously furnished with a letter signed by their superior officer empowering them to negotiate on his behalf.¹

Unfortunately, these preliminaries did not produce any agreement, as the Turkish Commander formulated the demand that hostilities should be terminated on condition that the Turkish troops, together with their arms, munitions, and supplies, should be transported in Greek boats to Tchésmé, and that the Greek troops should previously render him military honours.

Such demands were obviously unacceptable to the Commander of the Greek forces, indeed, when the desperate situation of the Turkish troops is taken into account, they may well appear impertinent. The officer in command had no other alternative but to cancel by a fresh order his previous instructions postponing the general attack.²

This order for some reason or other had not been marked confidential. In some unaccountable manner its contents had spread with lightning rapidity throughout the island, and a deputation of Turkish notables presented themselves once more before the Commander of the Greek troops and begged him to allow them to go and meet the Turkish Commander-in-chief with the object of persuading him to surrender.

Colonel Delagrammatikas with charming chivalry allowed them to pass the line, and gave them a letter to Zichny Bey informing him of his intention to attack at 7 a.m. the following morning.

When the deputation arrived at their destination and Zichny had been informed of the situation, he was convinced that the Greek Commander was bluffing,¹

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¹ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' order to all officers commanding units under his command, dated Chios, 18th December 1912, time 7 p.m. [See page 18.]
² Colonel N. Delagrammatikas' report to the Ministry of War, Athens, dated Chios, 18th December 1912, No. 772. [See pages 18 and 19.]
³ Lieut.-Colonel Zichny Bey, officer in command of the Turkish troops in Chios, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, officer in command of the Greek Troops of Occupation, dated 18th December 1912. [See page 19.]
otherwise he was certain that he would never have received such an intimation, and consequently the Turkish Deputation failed to carry to a successful end the mission that their compatriots had entrusted to them.

At 6 p.m. telegraphic instructions were received from the Ministry of War in Athens that the Greek Commander was not to agree that the Turkish officers and troops should remain as prisoners of war in Chios, and that if such a demand were to be formulated by the Turkish Commander further instructions were to be sought by Colonel Delagrammatikas. ¹ Shortly after the receipt of these instructions, another urgent telegram was received from the Ministry of War stating that the uttermost concession to be made to the Turkish Commander was that the officers would be allowed to bear their arms and be transported to Athens, whereas the troops would be disarmed and treated as prisoners of war and transported to some concentration camp. All war material was to be declared as booty. ²

Both these telegrams were immediately acknowledged by the Colonel in command, who stated that all negotiations had failed because the Turks insisted on retaining their arms and that the general attack would begin on the following day. ³

At 7 a.m. on the 20th December the whole island was shaken by the repercussion of the naval bombardment. The *Hesperia* directed her fire against the monastery of Aghion Pateron and Mount Provation.

¹ N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 19th December 1912, No. 6482. [See page 20.]
² N. Stratos, Ministry of War, Athens, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Athens, 19th December 1912, No. 104,244. [See pages 20 and 21.]
³ Colonel N. Delagrammatikas to N. Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, dated Chios, 19th December 1912, No. 731. [See page 21.]
abandoned war material. The enemy, pressed on all sides, continued his retirement to the positions Tessara Pigadia, Achlada, and Aghios Georgios Phlori. At these places the enemy offered but a weak resistance, and being pressed by the advance of the volunteer corps were outflanked and retired westward, in order to concentrate at Tessara Pigadia; but this position they were unable to consolidate and at 2 p.m. were forced southwards towards Kochliá.

In order to cut off the enemy forces at Pytiós and Amythounda a battalion was ordered to march to the north-west and another was sent in pursuit in the direction of Kochliá. Both these movements were carried out with complete success and the communication between the two sections of the enemy’s forces were thus severed. The battalion under Major Manouasaki arrived at Kochliá and attacked the enemy, who held the position known as Duo Adelphia, which he succeeded in occupying by 4 p.m.

(c) The 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Paparrodos, together with a Battery of Mounted Artillery and the detachment at Lithi, began their operations at 7 a.m. in the following manner. Under the support of the Artillery the Infantry attacked from Aghios Georgios Sikoussis and by 9 a.m. had occupied the enemy positions of Verouliá, Saliakoumou, Stavrón, Korakonero, and Koumarai. The detachment of Lopi proceeded from Lithi through Avgonyma and effected a junction with this battalion, and the two continued the attack towards Mount Provation. This operation, however, was extremely difficult in its execution owing to the very rugged formation of the ground, which the enemy had succeeded in fortifying to the best possible advantage. Nevertheless, by 4 p.m. this force was able to capture this mountain and the monastery of Aghiôn Paterôn.

Here they halted for the night, and on the following day continued the pursuit of the enemy who was retreating to the north-east.

(d) The depot battalion under Major Papadimitriou, together with the volunteer corps of Paphilida, advanced and occupied the monastery of Aghios Markos which the enemy had evacuated after a brief bombardment by the Fleet.

Zichny Bey, seeing that his main body of troops at Kochliá had been completely surrounded, and realizing that any further resistance could only result in their total annihilation, sent a flag of truce to Major Papadimitriou, to whom he handed a communication proposing a capitulation. The information was immediately communicated to the colonel in command that a flag of truce had been received (the same officer who on the previous day had been entrusted with the negotiations), and intimated that the Turkish Commander was prepared to accept a capitulation on the conditions laid down by the Greek Minister of War.1

Zichny Bey, however, knowing that the distance between Major Papadimitriou and the officer in supreme command was considerable, and fearing the total annihilation of his forces, sent another herald, through whom he declared his willingness to capitulate unconditionally together with the officers and troops under his command. At 8 p.m. Zichny Bey, accompanied by his officers, arrived at Karyès and placed himself at the disposal of Major Papadimitriou. Immediately following the surrender of the Turkish leader, the troops on the southern sector, amounting to 1,200 men, also capitulated at 9 a.m. on the following day, the 21st December.

1 Major Papadimitriou, Officer commanding the Independent Depot Battalion, to Colonel Delagrammatikas, dated Karyès, 20th December 1912, time 4.30 p.m. [See page 21.]
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While the above events were taking place at Karyès the Detachment under Sergeant Plastira at Langada, consisting of an Infantry Section of local volunteers and also of Cretans, had attacked the enemy at 7 a.m. along the line Rodinon–Phlori–Kouphogia–Pyrgon–Panaghia Kollianousa. The engagement was fairly evenly contested, but at midday the attacking force succeeded in effecting a breach in the Turkish line and the enemy retired rapidly towards Psira and thence southwards to Kochlià in order to effect a junction with their main body.

In the north part of the island the operations were carried on exclusively by the volunteer corps, which had pressed the enemy southward from Kardamyia. From the village of Viki the same operation had been completed, but the Commander of the Detachment had not received the order of postponement of operations and had consequently attacked on the morning of the 19th. Only after very evenly contested engagement did this force succeed in capturing the position of Aghia Elene and in pursuing the enemy as far as the ridge Prinòn–Persi–Psathophylio. The enemy retired to Kritikolakos.

Shortly after this engagement the order by which the operations had been postponed reached the Commander of the Detachment, who forthwith gave orders to cease all operations. On the following day, the 20th December, operations were renewed and the Greek forces succeeded in capturing the positions of Kritikolakos and the heights dominating Amythounda.

From Volissòs a similar kind of operation was carried into effect, and the volunteer corps succeeded in capturing the monastery of Moundôn and the villages of Diechà and Katavasis, their advance being supported by the Fleet moored in the Bay of Volissòs.

This engagement lasted for three hours, at the end of which the enemy was forced to retreat to Aghios Isidoros, and by 3 p.m. the Greek troops had occupied the mountain ridge between the rivers Aghios Isidoros and Ligarià with the intention of continuing on the following day the advance to Oros and Pytios. On the morning of the 21st December, just as the detachment from Volissòs was preparing to attack, the Turkish forces opposite to them situated between Amythounda and Aghios Isidoros hoisted the white flag and surrendered to the Greek Detachment. The enemy’s forces which had capitulated amounted to 1,994 officers and men. A very large quantity of war material and provisions fell into the hands of the Greek Army, and these by their quantity alone gave eloquent proof that these positions had been organized for defence long before the Greek descent upon Chios had been contemplated.

Immediately preparations were made for the transport of the Turkish prisoners to Greece and for the evacuation of the island by the Greek troops, which were already needed to take their place in other sectors of the theatre of war; only quite a small force was left in Chios to maintain order and to ensure the safety of the island.

It is no exaggeration to say that the successful outcome of the operations in Chios in 1912 was in great part due to the presence of the Greek Fleet, which at that time had become master of the Aegean, with the result that, after the defeat by land of the Turkish forces actually occupying the various islands, no further troops were necessary than those required for the maintenance of order and of the safety of the island. The Greek sovereignty over all the islands of the Aegean was being maintained by the Navy, which successfully blocked the exit of the Dardanelles. The
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The naval position of Greece towards Turkey in 1912 was very similar to that of England towards Germany during the Great War, as they each held their respective enemy’s fleet blockaded. Fortunately for Greece, Turkey had no submarines.

The news of the capitulation of the Turkish forces filled the hearts of the inhabitants with indescribable joy and feeling of relief. From the lips of all emanated proud words that at last the massacres of 1822 had been avenged by the destruction of the regular armed forces of their oppressors; history will record that not one Greek soldier or civilian had raised a hand against the defenceless Turkish population, and that in this way the superiority of their civilization and their moral character had been permanently established; but it need not be imagined that they had forgotten that the despots of 1822 had not confined their activities to the pursuit and defeat of the raiding band of Samians, but had turned upon the defenceless civilians by whose massacre they had sought to quench their relentless thirst for blood.

The whole of the main square of the town of Chios, as well as the neighbouring streets, was thronged with people of all classes and both sexes, who for hours never ceased giving vent to their feelings. As soon as the approach of the defeated Turkish commandant and officers was announced, the immense crowd, as if obeying an order of some unseen power, observed the most absolute silence.

Zichmy Bey was allowed to march in this dead silence through the streets to the ship which was to convey him and his officers as prisoners of war to Greece. So ended the longest period of continuous sovereignty, three hundred and forty-six years, recorded in the history of the island, and the Chians were destined to enjoy a period of absolute freedom, which had been unknown to the inhabitants of the island since the days of the Genoese dominion.

Of the descendants of the martyrs who were hanged on the 6th May 1822, few had the privilege of taking part in the operations which freed their native island from the Turkish yoke. These few may proudly claim, and others may proudly envy them, the personal satisfaction of having in some way contributed to avenge the massacres of their ancestors. Their names are the following:

AUGUSTUS STEPHEN AGEASTO; Left London to enlist as a private in the Reserve Battalion of the Manousaki and (to use the words of the General, then Captain and Adjutant, to the Commander of the Troops of Occupation) fought ‘As a true hero’.

Augustus Ageasto fully justified this opinion of his Superior four years later, when having enlisted as a volunteer in the cause of freedom in the army of his adopted country, he bravely fell in action on the French front on the 8th November 1916.

GEORGE CHOREMI; Served with the rank of Corporal in the Engineers. Owing to his having spent many years in Chios and to his complete knowledge of every inch of the ground, his services were invaluable to the Commander of the Forces, and on repeated occasions he was detailed as guide to the advancing troops. In this capacity he was continuously exposed to danger throughout the operations of 1912. Immediately following the capitulation of the Turkish forces, Colonel Delagrammatikas submitted to the Ministry of War a report, of which we append a translation:

‘Great services have been rendered to me by George Choremi, who was attached to my staff from Salonika. Owing to the lack of a map of Chios and to his complete knowledge of the mountainous districts of the island, he has
provided me with most valuable information concerning the
lie of the ground and the general disposition of the enemy
forces. Basing myself on these lines, I was able to form an
opinion concerning the possibility of attack and pursuit of
the enemy. He himself succeeded with the help of the in-
habitants, and at his own expense, in constructing bridges
and other means of communication for the ascent of the Aepos.
By these means it was made possible to mount the Field
Artillery on the top of the ridge; and in general by his
behaviour and his actions he has proved to be an ardent
patriot, and I consider him to be worthy of the highest
award on behalf of the State. What the State has done for
this young man I do not know; but his own island of origin
should consider him as one of the chief originators of its
freedom.'

PHILIP CHRYSOVELONI; In 1897 left his home in
England and enlisted in the Engineers, taking part
in the whole campaign which ultimately proved so
disastrous to the fortunes of Greece. In 1912 he again
enlisted as a private in the Battalion of Manousaki.
On several occasions during the operations which
resulted in the freedom of Chios, his name was men-
tioned in dispatches by his commanding officer. He
is the grandson of John Chrysoveloni, who played
a prominent part during the War of Independence
and enjoyed the confidence of Count Capodistria.

NOTE.—Practically all the information relative to the
capture of Chios by the Greeks has been taken from General
Peter G. Karakassonis' 'Ιστορία της 'Αντελευθερωτικής της Χίου
κατά τό 1912.—'Αθήναι 1928. The author of this work was at
the time of the Occupation Adjutant to the officer command-
ing the Troops of Occupation, serving with the rank of
Captain. With the idea of one day publishing the history
of the campaign, he kept a detailed diary, and consequently
the information is in no way the product of recollections.
General Karakassonis very kindly consented to free use being
PART II
CHIOS DURING THE GREAT WAR
INTRODUCTION

CHIOS DURING THE GREAT WAR

FOR Greece the Great War began in 1912 and ended in 1922, during which period the Greek Army realized the heights of glory, winning the admiration of Europe, and touched, too, the depths of a defeat as serious and as far-reaching in its consequences as any which have attended field operations.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913, Chios, as we have seen, formed an integral part of the Turkish Empire, and consequently the inhabitants of the island were unable to provide a fighting force for their country: they were, however, well represented in the ranks of the Greek army by a great number of volunteers who enlisted and took part in the Balkan Wars.

At the beginning of the European War, Greece found herself in the throes of a bitter political controversy, between those who were in favour of immediate participation in the World War and those who were in favour of observing neutrality as being more advantageous to a small country.

Owing to the great connexions of Chios with England and France, the sympathy of the inhabitants was very strongly in their favour, and they were also mindful of the fact that they had gained their freedom from the Turkish yoke under the auspices of the government and diplomacy of Eleftherios Venizelos. For these reasons they were enthusiastic supporters of the latter's political party in the State, and when in 1916 the provisional government of Salonika was formed, the Chians were among the first to join the movement.

Nicholas Plastiras, shortly after the Balkan Wars,
had been sent by the General Staff to draw up an accurate topographical map of the island: it has been seen, in the account of the capture of Chios in 1912, that they did not possess such a map. Lieutenant Plastiras during his survey of the island so far won the affection and admiration of many that, when the question arose who was to be entrusted with the training of the unit to be contributed by Chios to the army of the provisional government, the islanders asked to be placed under his leadership. Their demand was satisfied and Plastiras undertook the training of the Chian Regiment, which was styled the 6th Regiment of the Archipelago Division. After a very arduous six months' training the Regiment was sent to the Macedonian Front and took part in all the battles in which the Greek Army was involved, including the memorable victory of Skrà on the 17th May 1918, in which it played a leading part. The Chian Regiment was destined to receive a very severe baptism of fire as soon as it took up its position on the Macedonian Front. In the words of its leader the behaviour of two companies will always remain imprinted vividly in my memory; they were suddenly bombarded when in the open plain by very severe artillery fire, during which about 2,000 shells were fired in the space of half an hour. Although it was their baptism of fire, the Chians behaved with admirable sang-froid, and on their own initiative took all the necessary measures that the circumstances demanded and consequently sustained negligible losses.\footnote{See K. Λευταντ—Χιακά Χρονικά—ἐν Ἀθήναις, 1919, Τέχνας η, p. 196.}

After five months' service in the line, a very important strategic section was entrusted to the Chian detachment, which was specially chosen by the Divisional Commander, as these islanders had already gained a reputation for intelligence and adaptability to circumstances, as well as for bravery.

A few years ago, owing to the great experience of Nicholas Plastiras, then Colonel,\footnote{Now, General.} I asked him if he would give me his candid opinion of the Chian as a soldier. Shortly afterwards I received the letter which is reproduced among the documents, and of which part is here translated:

I was attached to the Mission which was sent to Chios to train the first conscripts, and I arrived there in 1914. I worked as conscientiously as I could, both then and during the period of 1916, when I returned to Chios on the orders of the provisional government of Salonica. For this reason I venture to say that I am more qualified than any one else to pronounce an opinion about the Chian as a soldier. The Army is the real civilian school, where one has the best opportunity of analysing the civic virtues of a people, and thus I had the opportunity of appreciating the rare qualities of character and intelligence of the Chian.

I particularly noticed the intelligence of the raw recruits and their natural facility for learning, their enthusiasm, their proud carriage, and their unusual comprehension of their duty. Later on, when the recruit became trained, I found him to be capable and ready for any sacrifice on behalf of his Country, full of goodwill and always very sure of himself. Wherever I met him it was always the same. I have had a very large number of Chians under my orders, and during long periods both on the Macedonian Front, in the Ukraine, and also in Asia Minor, the Chian was always the first in the attack and the last in the retreat, brave, dogged, and keen for distinction. The consideration I have for the Chian soldier is based on my own experience and on what I have seen with my own eyes. In the 6th Regiment of the Division of the Archipelago nearly all my men were Chians, and I am therefore in a position to state that the reputation for cowardice, which others imputed to the Chians during the
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Following General Plastiras’ recommendation and owing to his personal intervention, it has been possible to collect a selection, reproduced amongst the documents, of these army orders, the last of which is the order of the day when the General, then Colonel, handed over the commandship of the Chian Regiment.

In 1914 the Chian Regiment was styled the 44th Infantry Regiment. In 1917 it was named the 5th Regiment of the Archipelago Division and, after the revolution of 1922 and the subsequent reorganization of the Army, the 23rd Independent Battalion.

When in May–June 1914 the Young Turk Government had decreed the expulsion of the Greek element in the population, 36,000 refugees from the Erythrea peninsula fled to and settled in Chios, where they remained until the end of 1918. But when Greece was authorized by the Great Powers to occupy the Smyrna enclave, these refugees practically all returned to their homes in the assurance that these had become an integral part of their mother country. A different fate however awaited them! The defeat of the Greek Army in August 1922 entailed a second emigration, and 60,000 refugees descended upon Chios. Of these today only 18,000 (4,300–4,500 families) have remained permanently in the island, the remainder having been settled in different parts of Greece. The majority of them reside in the town of Chios, whose population in 1920 was 20,032 and today has been increased to 33,000.

Of these 4,500 families, 1,700 are engaged in agriculture and are distributed as follows: 900 in the town, 100 in the neighbouring villages of the Campos, 120 at Cardamyla, 40 at Volissos, 240 in the mastic-producing villages of the south, and 300 in the small adjacent islands of Oinousae (Spalmadores)
and Psarà. Of the 900 families which live in the town of Chios, 300 work in the gardens of the Campos and the remainder in the factories and brick-kilns (tiles), in the manufacture of the local sweetmeats for which the island is famous, and in weaving of cotton materials.

In 1922, exactly one hundred years after the Massacres, Chios was again destined to be closely connected with one of the greatest disasters in the history of modern Greece.

Towards the end of August and the beginning of September, Chios was the theatre of a tragic scene. A great Greek Army, the first since the days of Alexander the Great to tread the soil of Ionia, had suffered irretrievable defeat, had been expelled bag and baggage from Asia Minor, together with the civilian Greek population which for thousands of years had been the driving power and made up the educated classes of those regions. Owing to its geographical proximity to Smyrna, Chios had been chosen as the clearing-house for these unfortunate military and civilian refugees. Within a few days, not only had the majority of the Army arrived, but civilians in tens of thousands flooded the island, having fled in panic from their homes to avoid the sword of the victorious Turk, whom they knew from experience to be such a gentleman! The small harbour of Chios was black with ships which, as soon as they had disembarked one cargo, immediately returned to the mainland to fetch another.

The escape of the Greek Army and of the civilian population in 1922 was entirely due to the admirable behaviour of the Fleet, whose discipline, in spite of

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1 This information about the refugees was provided by Mr. Alexander Pallis, one of the chief members of the Commission for the Settlement of Refugees in Greece, whose work in this connexion has won universal admiration. [See pages 41-56.]
the rank and file, owing to lack of education or comprehension of the situation, gave rise to incidents of insubordination. Luckily, however, the wiser counsels of the officers prevailed, and no political outburst took place whilst the Army was still in the field. But immediately after their defeat, when they found themselves derelict and scattered throughout the islands of the Aegean, definite revolutionary tendencies were unmistakably discernible. The most prominent leader was Colonel Plastiras, who had made his way with his Regiment to Chios. Chios had been chosen as the most suitable centre of operations: first of all because there had been collected by far the greatest numbers of the defeated army: secondly, because this island was nearest to the coast of Asia Minor, and consequently transportation was more easily effected: thirdly, because it was conveniently situated on the route to Athens, which was the objective of the discontented officers: and finally, because at Chios was concentrated the largest division of the Fleet, whose adherence to any such projected movements was absolutely indispensable, for otherwise the revolutionary elements would have found themselves in the extraordinary position of having been driven out of the mainland by the enemy, and of having taken refuge in the Islands of the Aegean where they could have been blockaded and starved out by their own National Fleet had they not been able to prevail upon it to fall in with their views concerning the actualities of the day.

The day following his arrival in Chios, namely the 3rd 1 September, Colonel Plastiras immediately began tentative negotiations. The first meetings took place on the 4th September at the house of George Choremi, situated at the end of the ancient street Aplotarià; here Colonel Plastiras met various naval officers who were able through their influence to communicate his views to their fellow officers in the Navy, and consequently within a very few days all the ships of the Greek Navy at Chios with the exception of the battleship Kilkis had joined the revolutionary party. It was fortunate for the revolutionaries that the Kilkis received the order on the 8th September to repair to Mytilene, and thence to Salonica where the Government feared that incidents of mutiny among the troops might take place. Either in the house of George Choremi or in that of John Livanoú, Colonel Plastiras continued his negotiations, which every day were growing more and more extensive. In the meantime, however, a similar revolutionary outbreak had taken place amongst the officers who had been landed on the neighbouring island of Mytilene, where Colonels Mamouris and Protosyngelos were the leaders in regular communication with Colonel Plastiras. Colonel Gonatás, who had arrived at Mytilene in command of the remnants of the first Army Corps, when at first approached, was very guarded in his replies. Later on, however, when the news of the spread of the revolution reached Mytilene, Colonel Gonatás abandoned all reserve and decided to place himself at the head of the movement in Mytilene. It was unquestionably very difficult for the negotiations between Chios and Mytilene to be carried on in secrecy, without the knowledge of the authorities. This, however, was effected by aeroplane and by ships. It is difficult to understand how this secrecy was maintained at all, because the very fact of an aeroplane plying frequently between two islands would surely have

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1 The dates in this account are according to the Julian calendar which was then in use throughout Greece. It was during the revolutionary régime that subsequently Greece officially adopted the Gregorian calendar.
awakened suspicions of the local military and civil authorities, which remained faithful to the Athens Government. It was, however, in the general interest that secrecy be maintained in order to avoid the clash of arms between the revolutionary party and the faithful adherents of the Athens Government, for any such unfortunate incident might conceivably have led to the outbreak of civil war; had such a misfortune immediately followed the defeat of the Army, the very existence of the State would have been imperilled.

The 7th September proved an eventful day, and possibly the turning-point of the fortunes of the revolutionary party. News arrived at Chios that the revolution was rapidly spreading throughout Mytilene, and Commander Voutras, Captain of the destroyer *Niki*, joined the revolutionary ranks, together with the whole crew of the ship. The commander of the battle-cruiser *Lemnos* also adhered to the movement and offered to place himself at the head of the units of the Fleet which had already joined in the revolution. Finally, on the same day, the first division, including the Regiments of the 1st/38th Evzones and the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiment, declared themselves in favour of the revolutionaries. To these were added the 22nd, 23rd, and 37th Regiments as well as the other units of the Second Army Corps. On the 21st the Regiments of the 3rd/40th Evzones and the 25th, 26th, and 32nd Infantry Regiments of the 4th and 5th Divisions did likewise. On the 25th, under the leadership of Colonel Plastiras, his famous 5th/42nd Regiment of Evzones, together with the 2nd, 3rd, and 62nd Regiments and with units of the 18th and 31st Infantry Regiments, openly declared themselves in favour of the Revolution, under the leadership of Colonel Plastiras himself. It must not, however, be imagined that complete secrecy had been maintained. The authorities had grave suspicions regarding the loyalty of the troops, but amidst the chaos which accompanied the defeat, they were unable to take effective measures.

On the 9th September, after previous consultation between the leaders of the units which had secretly declared themselves in favour of the Revolution, a committee consisting of Colonels Nicholas Plastiras, Panagiotis, Gardika, and Miltiades Koimisis, under the Presidency of the first-named, was entrusted with the leadership of the Revolution. Major Euripides Bakirdzis was appointed chief of the staff. On the evening of that same day the first order emanating from the Revolutionary Committee was drawn up, written in pencil and bearing no signatures, and was immediately distributed to the various units.

On Saturday, the 10th September, all was ready. It was no longer necessary to maintain secrecy, the majority of the units having already confidentially communicated their desire to join the movement, and Colonel Plastiras took up his head-quarters in the house of John Livanoù, which overlooks the canal of Chios. On that day the chief of staff drew up the first official order of the Revolutionary Committee, which contained detailed instructions and was communicated to all units.¹

Just as the above instructions had been issued, a few moments of uneasiness were experienced about midnight on Saturday, 10th–11th September, when news arrived at the revolutionary head-quarters that the local military authorities had realized the situation and were taking certain precautionary measures. For

¹ This order is reproduced in extenso as being historically interesting from a local point of view and throwing light on the events which took place in Chios in September 1922. [See pages 41–47.]
a few hours the execution of the instructions was delayed, but without bloodshed the Revolution succeeded in outmanoeuvring the loyalist authorities, and at 2 a.m. of the 11th September the Revolution was officially declared. Various units of the Fleet were boarded and their officers overpowered. On Sunday, the 11th September, the revolutionaries were complete masters of the island. The same fortune had attended their movements in Mytilene. At this juncture, however, a very slight divergence of opinion occurred between the leaders in Mytilene and the leaders in Chios. Those in Mytilene wished, before descending upon Athens, to assure themselves of the adherence of all the officers of the Army and the Navy. Colonel Plastiras, however, and all his staff at Chios desired as quickly as possible to take the Athenian Government by surprise, before they had time to take any precautionary measures. After very few negotiations an amicable compromise was reached. Immediately upon the outbreak of the Revolution all the military and civilian authorities in Chios were replaced. Dr. Apostolos Psalt of Smyrna was appointed Governor-General, Colonel John Kotoulas Military Governor, and Leonidas Mylonas, Mayor, while the Constabulary and Police were entrusted to Major E. Papanikolaou.

On the night of the 11th September, the units were already on board the ships that were to convey them to Piraeus. Colonel Plastiras went on board the battleship *Lemnos*, and at midnight on the 11th September the Revolutionary Army and the Fleet left the shores of Chios under the leadership of Commander Petropoulaki. On the evening of the 12th September they effected a junction on the high seas with the Revolutionary Forces from Mytilene, the leaders of which at 8 a.m. on the 13th September went on board the *Lemnos* and held lengthy conferences concerning the objects to be pursued by the Revolution. The leadership of the Revolution was entrusted to Colonel Stylianós Gonatás. The Revolutionary Committee was increased to 12 members, and the Executive was entrusted to a triumvirate, consisting of Colonels Stylianós Gonatás, Nicholas Plastiras, and Commander Phocás.

The evolution of subsequent events being in no way immediately connected with the local history of the island of Chios, there is no object in recording them here. It is enough to mention that King Constantine was forced to abdicate, his son King George II was allowed to reign from the 14th September 1922 to the 10th December 1923, when he was dethroned. The Republic was proclaimed on the 25th March 1924 by vote of the fourth National Assembly. Thus it may be seen in summary how far-reaching, for the history of modern Greece, were the political results of the Revolution which had broken out in Chios and Mytilene. To-day we are still too near to such important events to be able to judge impartially whether they were the outcome of wisdom alone; and the bitter political feeling, to which these events gave rise, was far too keen until recently for it to be possible for an unbiased opinion to be formed. Thus we have reached the last milestone in the contemporary history of Chios, and it may be left to one of the younger generation to frame an opinion for the guidance of posterity. The object of this work will have been attained if the foregoing account be considered by a future historian of Chios as a true and accurate statement of facts, providing sufficient material of local interest to ensure that the events which took place in the Island, and the part played by it in the history of modern Greece should not be lost in
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oblivion and all traces effaced by the devastating march of time.

NOTE—The greater part of the information relating to the Revolution of 1922 was courteously provided by the late Mr. Christophoros Rodocanachi, former Senator for Chios, who closely collaborated with General Plastiras during the preparation of the coup d'état. I am sincerely grateful to him.
I

MILITARY DISPATCHES AND ORDERS

GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, Officer Commanding the [1]
2nd Division, to the Officers Commanding the 1st and
7th Infantry Regiments and the 2nd Regiment of Field
Artillery.

[Αριθ. 599]

"Αμα τῇ λήψει τῆς παρούσης νὰ ἔτοιμασθῶμε τῶν τάγματα τοῦ 1ου συντάγματος, πλὴν τῶν τάγματος τοῦ
ἐχόντος τὴν φρουράν, καὶ ἐν τάγμα τοῦ 7ου πεδικοῦ
συντάγματος δὲ ἐκκίνησιν μὲ πλήρη ἐφοδιασμὸν. Τὰ
τρία ταῦτα τάγματα θὰ ἀποτελέσωμε πλήρες σύνταγμα
ὑπὸ τὰς διατάξις τοῦ συντάγματάρχου Δηλαγραμμάτικα,
ὑπὸ τὰς διατάξις τὰς τεθή καὶ μία πυροβολαρχία τοῦ
2ου συντάγματος πεδικοῦ πυροβολικὸν ἕτοιμη ἐπίσης
πρὸς ἐκκίνησιν.

ἀναφέρατε τὴν ἀραν, καθ’ ἐν ἡ δυνάμει αὕτη ὅπως
ἐνεπάλημνη διατάξις ἐκκινήσεως.

"Εν Θεσσαλονίκη, τῇ 6η Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης,
Ὑπευθύνως.

GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, Officer commanding the [2]
2nd Division, to the Officers Commanding the 1st and
7th Infantry Regiments and the 2nd Regiment of Field
Artillery.

[Αριθ. 601]

Κατόπιν τῆς χθεσινῆς υπ’ ἀριθ. 599 διατάξις μου
ἐντέλλομαι, ὅπως τὸ 7ον σύνταγμα χορηγήσῃ δύο τάγματα
ἀντὶ τοῦ 1ου, όπερ ἦν χορηγήσῃ ἐν μόνον τάγμα.

"Εν Θεσσαλονίκη, τῇ 7ῃ Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης,
Ὑπευθύνως.
[3] GENERAL CONSTANTINE KALLARIS, Officer commanding the 2nd Division, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding Chios Expeditionary Force.

[Ἀρθ. 607]

'Ἡ πυροβολαρχία καὶ τὰ τάγματα, τὰ διαταχθέντα νὰ δοὺν ἑτοιμὰ πρὸς ἐκκίνησιν, θέλουσιν ἐπιβιβασθῆ τὸ ταχύτερον εἰς τὰ ἀναμένοντα ἀτμόσφαιρα "Πατρίδα" καὶ "Σαπφώ". 

Ἐν Θεσσαλονίκη, τῇ 8η Νοεμβρίου 1912.

Κ. Καλλάρης, Ὑποστράτηγος.

[4] N. STRATOS, Minister of Marine, Athens, to the HARBOUR MASTER, SALONIKA.

[Ἀρθ. 1490]

'Επιβιβάσατε διατεθὲν ὑπὸ Ἀρχιστρατήγου σύνταγμα ἐπὶ "Πατρίδος" καὶ "Σαπφώ", διατάξατε ταύτα ν' ἀποπλεύσωσι πρὸς τὸ ἐσπέρα καὶ κατευθύνωσι πρὸς τὴν πρωτεύουσαν τῆς Χίου Κάστρο δι’ ἀνωτάτης ταχύτητας των ἐξωθεὶς ταύτης θα συναντήσωσι τῶν στόλων καὶ θα τεθῶσιν ὑπὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τοῦ μοιράρχου Μοίρας Εὐδόμων πλοιάρχου Δαμανοῦ, ἐπιβαίνοντος τῆς "Εσπερίας". Τηλεγραφήσατε ἀπόπλουν καὶ ταχύτητα.

Στράτας, Ἡγούμενοι Ναυτικῶν.


[Ἀρθ. 5960]

Διμενήκα Ἀρχη Θεσσαλονίκης πρὸς τὸν Κυβερνήτην τῆς "Πατρίδος".

Κατόπιν τοῦ ὑπὸ χθεσινῆς ἡμερομηνίας ὑπ' ἅρθ. 57 ἔγγραφου μας σὰς γνωστοποιοῦμεν ὅτι τὸ προϊστάμενον "Τσουργείαν διὰ τῆς ὑπ' ἅρθ. 1490 τηλεγραφῆς διατα-
CHIUS LIBERATA

[7] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, ATHENS, and to HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DIADOCH, Salonika.

Πλοίον "Πατρίς", 11–11–12, ὀρα 5,10′ μ. μ.
Πρὸς τὴν Ὑπουργείον τῶν Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθῆνας.
Πρὸς τὴν Ἀ.Β.Υ. τὴν Διάδοχον, Θεσσαλονίκην.

Ἄρρηθέν τοι στρατιωτικῷ διοικητῷ Χίου παραδόθη τὰ διότε ἀναλογίας ἀποβίβασιν στρατοῦ εἰς παράλληλον Κοντάρι ὑπὸ προστασίαν στόλου. Ἀρρηθέν τοι ἡμέραν δυνάμεως μου καὶ τοῦ ἐξαιτίατος ἀποβίβασις μέχρι πέρατος αὐτῆς.
Εὐθύσιον μὲν ὅραν μακρὰν τῆς πόλεως. Διὰ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματι κατάληψιν αὐτῆς.

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητής στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

[8] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL UNITS under his command.

Κοντάρι 12–11–12, ὀρα 5 ι. μ.

"Ὁ Διοικητής τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς Χίου πρὸς τὰ ὅπερ ἐμὲ τίμημα στρατοῦ.
Ἄρρηθέν τοι στρατοῦ πληρωματικῆς ἐνὶ συνομήνου τοῦ στρατοῦ τῆς Κατοχῆς Χίου ἵππῳ τοῦ ἐπιτελείου τῆς πρωτευούσης τῆς νήσου (Χίου). Πρὸς τὸν τοῦτο τὸ 30αν τάγμα τοῦ ιουνίου συντάγματος, ἐνὶ τῷ προσκολλῷ καὶ τῷ ναυτικῷ ἄγγελῳ, ἀποβίβασις τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας. Διοικητής τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας ὁ λοχαγὸς Ἀριστείδης Κουβέλης. 800 μέτρα ὀπίεις τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας τοῦ 10αν τάγμα του 7ου συντάγματος ὑπὸ τὴν κύριον σύμβουλον καὶ ἀνὰ τοῦ τοῦ 30αν τάγμα του 7ου συντάγματος, ὑπὸ τὰ ἀφοῦ ἐνα ὕλημα ὑπὸ ὑποβιβασίας.

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητής στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

MILITARY DISPATCHES AND ORDERS

[9] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to CAPTAIN PAPAKYRIAZIS, Officer commanding the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment.

Κοντάρι, 12–11–12, ὀρα 5,20′ ι. μ.

"Ὁ Διοικητής τοῦ στρατοῦ τῆς Κατοχῆς πρὸς τὸν Διοικητή τοῦ ιουνίου τάγματος, 7ου συντάγματος λοχαγῷ Παπακυριάζη.

"Ὑπερτεροκληθείσης τῆς πόλεως τῆς Χίου, ἡ διηγομενὴ πρὸς τὸν προσελκύοντα τῷ μακρὸν τῆς πόλεως τῇ τῆς προσελκυόντος τῷ Χίου, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπιθέσεων τῆς προσελκύουσας τῇ πρωτευούσῃ τῆς νήσου (Χίου). Πρὸς τὸ τοῦτο τὸ 30αν τάγμα τοῦ ιουνίου συντάγματος, ὑπὸ τὸ προσκολλῇ καὶ τῷ ναυτικῷ ἄγγελῷ, ἀποβίβασις τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας. Διοικητής τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας ὁ λοχαγὸς Αριστείδης Κουβέλης. 800 μέτρα ὀπίεις τῆς ἐμπροσθοβιβασίας τοῦ 10αν τάγμα του 7ου συντάγματος ὑπὸ τὴν κύριον σύμβουλον καὶ ἀνὰ τοῦ τοῦ 30αν τάγμα του 7ου συντάγματος, ὑπὸ τὰ ἀφοῦ ἐνα ὕλημα ὑπὸ ὑποβιβασίας.

N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητής στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

Proclamation of COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the INHABITANTS of CHIOS.

ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ 'ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ
GEΩΡΓΙΟΣ Α', ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΤΩΝ 'ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ.
Εἰς ὑνόμιμα τοῦ Βασιλέως τῶν 'Ελλήνων Γεωργίου τοῦ Α' καταλαμβάνω τὴν νῆσον Χίου καὶ προσκαλοῦ ἀποτικοὺς τὸς κατοίκους εἰς ὑπερτέρην ὑπόταξην ὑποκόριος αὐτοῖς ἀνα μισικρίσεως φυλῆς καὶ βραχείας ἀσφάλειας ζωῆς, τιμῆς καὶ κατανάλωσισ.
Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 12–11–12.

"Ο Τσαπτσάττης "Ο Διοικητής τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς ΠΑΡΑΚΑΣΤΟΥΝ, N. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.
11] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.

'Υπουργείον Στρατιωτικών, Άθηνας.

'Όμηρος 8ης πρωίας κατέλαβεν Ἑλληνικὸς Βασιλικὸς στρατὸς τὴν πρωτεύουσαν τῆς Χίου. Ο ἐν αὐτῇ τούρκικος στρατὸς καὶ ὁ ἐν Κοστάρι τουλώτος συμποσούμενος εἰς 1800 διεσπάρθη εἰς τὰ ὄρη. Ἔθελοντος προκήρυξιν ὅτι κατέλαβον τὴν νῆσον Χίου ἐν ὑμνίῳ τοῦ Βασιλέως τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τοὺς πολίτας εἰς ύποφθήνῃ ὑποσχεθεὶς αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν ζωῆς, τιμῆς καὶ περιουσίας ἀνεξαρτήτως θρησκευμάτως.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 12–11–12, ὀμηρ. 8,45 π. μ.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας, Νομικὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

12] CAPTAIN ARISTEIDES KOUVELIS, Officer commanding the Advance Guard pickets at Karyes, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

'Ο εἰς τὰ ὑπόβαθρα τῶν Καρνίων ὑψάματα ἔναρξε δὲν εἶναι μὲν μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μὲνεν ὀμοίως ἐκεῖ καὶ πυροβολεῖ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς, διότι ἐντεύθεν άναβασις εἶναι δύνατος καὶ ἐπομένως εὐρίσκεται ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ. �uations δὲν κατέχομεν τὸ χωρίον Καρνάς καὶ Ἁγίαν Μάρκον, ὅτες εὐρίσκεται εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ύψος καὶ δεξιότεροι τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους κατεχομένων υψομάτων, ἀνάγκη νὰ σταλῇ τιμήν τι, ὁπερ πλευρικῶς (Βορείως) νὰ ἐκδιώχῃ αὐτῶν τῶν θέσεων, ἃς κατέχει.

'Εκ τῶν ἀραιῶν πυροβολισμῶν ἑπταμείσθησαν δύο στρατιώται δύο τῶν τὸσον ἐλαφρῶς, ὡστε δὲν ἔχουσιν ἀνάγκην νοσηλεύτας.

Τῇ 13–11–12.

Κουβέλης, Λοχαγός.

13] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

Πρὸς τὸν Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, διὰ τοῦ Κυβερνήτου τοῦ ύπερωκείαν “Πατρίδος”.

Κατεδιόρισε τούρκικον στρατόν, μέχρις οἱ κατά-στρέφεται αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναγκάσησε πρὸς παράδοσιν.

Ἐν Αθήναις, τῇ 13–11–12.

Βενιζέλος, 'Υπουργείον Στρατιωτικών.

14] CAPTAIN ARISTEIDES KOUVELIS, Officer commanding the Advance Guard pickets at Karyes, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

Δύο ἀπόσπαρα εὑρέθησαν (ἐκ Καρνίων) ἀπέτυχον, διότι 20–25 ἀνδρὲς ἐν Ἀγίῳ Μάρκῳ ἀμυνόμενοι εἶναι ἀρκετοὶ νὰ κρατήσωσιν ὀλόκληρον λεγέωνα.

Τῇ 15–11–12.

Κουβέλης.

15] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.

'Υπουργείον Στρατιωτικών, Άθηνας.

'Ανευ ἀποστολῆς ἐνὸς τούλαχιστον συντάγματος μετὰ μᾶς πυροβολισμῶν ταχυβόλων ὀλοσχερῆς κατάληψις τῆς νῆσου ἀδύνατος. Τηπάρχουν 2200 Τούρκοι μετὰ δύο πυροβολών καὶ κατέχοντον ὀξυρωπάτας καὶ δυσπροσίτους θέσεως. Μάχονται κατὰ σύντημα Μπέαρας. Τούρκικος στρατὸς διατέλεσεν ἐν ἄγνοιᾳ συμβάντων. Εὐρωπαϊκῆς Τούρκιας ἔχει ἠθικῶν ἀκμαίων.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 16–11–12.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας, Νομικὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.
ΕΛΕΦΕΡΙΟΣ ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΣ, Μινιστήριο της Αμμοκαταδίωξης, Αθήνα, στοΝ. ΔΕΛΑΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ, Αρχηγός Υπηρεσιών Στρατιωτικών, Χίος.

Επιστευτότερον, έλαβε αναφερόμενον αποτελέσμα ανένευση μεγάλων θυσιών. Μεταχειρίσθησε αποκλεισμόν, εν ανάγκη δε και απόβασιν εις άλλην άκτην εκ συνεννοήσεως μετά ναυάρχου, υπό τον διατάγας διατελείες.

'Εν Αθήνας, τῇ 17-11-12.

Βενιζέλος,
'Υπουργός Στρατιωτικών.

[16] ELEFHERIOS VENIZELOS, Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Αριθ. 94117]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικα, Χίον.

Πληροφορήστε όλα της λεγειακής χωρίας από τον περμανήτης καταστάσεως πολεμικής επιχειρήσεως.

'Εν Χίρω, τῇ 21-11-12.

Ν. Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικήτης του στρατού Κατοχής.

PAUL COUNDOURIOTIS, Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, [18] to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Αριθ. 1217]

Δια επίσημον.

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμμάτικα, Χίον.

Πληροφορήστε όλα της λεγειακής χωρίας από τον περμανήτης καταστάσεως πολεμικής επιχειρήσεως.

'Εν Μούδρω, τῇ 29-11-12.

Κουντουριώτης,
'Αρχηγός στόλου.

[18] PAUL COUNDOURIOTIS, Admiral commanding the Greek Fleet, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Αριθ. 425]

'Αρχηγόν στόλου υποναύαρχου Κουντουριώτην, Μούδρον.

'Εγκατελείφθη επιθετική επιχείρησις καὶ ενεργούμενος αποκλεισμόν τῶν κατοικημένων μερῶν. 'Ενεργείας μας εγκυρώσαμε υποτρεπτικά.

'Εν Χίρω, τῇ 29-11-12.

Δελαγραμμάτικας,
Διοικήτης στρατού Κατοχής.
**Military Dispatches and Orders**

**Nicholas Stratos, Minister of War, Athens, to Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.**

[ʼΑρθ. 94504]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμματίκαν, Χίου.

Αφίκοντο ἡδη αὐτότι οἱ ἀποσταλέντες Κρήτες ἐθελοντα, διετήθη ὡστε δύναμις τετρακυκλιῶν περίπου ἄνδρων μετὰ μίας ὀρεβατικῆς πυροβολαρχίας διʼ ἐπιχείρησις κατὰ τοῦρκικοῦ στρατοῦ Χίου, ἀνερχομένου κατὰ τὰς ἦμετρας πληροφορίας ἐις δυσχέλους διακοσίους. Ἡ διπλασία καὶ ἄριθμον δύναμις αὐτῇ μετὰ τὴν παρασχεθεῖσαν ἡδη ἀνάπαυσιν θεωροῦ ἐπάναγυς να προηγοῦσι ταχέως πρὸς καταστροφήν του κυρίου τρήματος του ἐπὶ τῆς νήσου τοῦ τοῦρκικοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ καταστρέψῃ τοῦτον πρὸ τῆς ἀναιμομένης πρὶ στὸ τέλος τῆς ἐβδομάδος ἀνακωχῆς ἐν συνεννοήσει μετὰ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ τῆς αὐτοῦ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως.

Στράτος,

Ὑπουργός Στρατιωτικών.

**Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the Ministry of War, Athens.**

[ʼΑρθ. 430]

Ὑπουργεῖον Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθηνᾶς.

Διαταγαθείσα προδότας ώς κοστίσῃ πρὶν αἷμα, ἀποτελεῖν αὐτῆς ἀμφίβολον, ἔχθρος κατέχει χυροπίτας καὶ δυσπροσίτους θέσεις, μελετηθείσας καὶ ὀργανισθείσας παρὰ αὐτοῦ πρὸ ἐτοῦ, ἐπικεκυμένης ἰταλικῆς κατοχῆς. Οὐδεμίας ὑδραυλοχώρησις, προδιαγραφές στράτως θὰ διέλθῃ διʼ ὀρισμένων ἀγραπτῶν καὶ ἄνδρα καταστραμμένων καὶ ἀνευ συνοχῆς. Ἠνεκεν ἀπολειών καὶ ἀσθενείας ἐμπόλεμος δύναμις συντάξαμασ περιορίζηται εἰς 2100. Ἀποσταλεῖσα ἐσχάτως δύναμις 950 ἄνδρῶν ἀνάκκατον καὶ διουκομένη παρὰ διλόγων στελεχῶν ἀπαντῶν ἐφεδρῶν ἀνίκαιος διʼ ἐπιθετικήν ἐνέργειαν. Κρήτες διετήσαντο διάφορα σημεία διὰ κλειστοπόλεμου.

"Εσπερία" μόνον ὑπάρχῃ ἐδώ, λοιπῶν πλοίων διατεθέντων ἀλλαχῶν. Ταχυδρομικῶς λεπτομερῆς ἐκθέσεις. Διατάξεστε.

Διοικητὴς στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

N. Δελαγραμματίκας,

Συνταγματάρχης.

Report of Colonel N. Delagrammatikas, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, sent by special messenger to the Ministry of War, Athens.

Ὁ ἔχθρος ἀνερχόμενος εἰς 2200–2300 ἔκτος τῶν ἀκολουθησάμου πολιτῶν κατέχει διὶ τοῦ πλείστου μέρους τῆς δυνάμεως του τάς μεγαλετέρας ἁφανείς καὶ ἴος ἔκτος βολής ἀποκρήμων κυριφάς τῶν ὀρέων τῆς βορείου Χίου, διὰ μικρῶν δὲ ἀποπτασμάτων 20–80 ἄνδρων τὰς ἐς ἵον ἀπότομοι, ὀποστήθητο ὡς χαμηλότερα κυριφάς, ὡς καὶ τὰς εἰς ταύτης ἀποληγούσας προσβάσεις (χαραδράς, ἀρατούς κ.λ.π.);

Ὁ ἦμετρος στρατὸς, ἀνερχόμενος εἰς 2100, κατέχει διὰ μὲν τῶν τριών ταχυμάτων ἀπὸ Ἀγίου Γεωργίου μέχρι Βροῦταδος (τοῦ τετάρτου μένοντος ὡς ἐπιφυλακῆς), διὰ τῶν ἀνταρτῶν δὲ Κρητῶν καὶ ἠθέλων τὰ ΝΔ μέρη ἀποκλείσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἔθρων καὶ περιορίζων τούτων εἰς ἄς κατέχει θέσεις καὶ ἐν αἰς τρία μόνον χαρία περιλαμβανόνται, ἐξ ὦν ἐλαχίστης ποσότητας δύναται νὰ πορισθῇ τροφῆς κ.λ.π.

Σοβαρὰ καὶ ἀποτελεσματικὴ ἐπίθεσις κατὰ τῶν θέσεων τοῦ ἔθρου παρεκκενασμένου εἰς ἅμοιν καὶ γνώστου του ἐθάνου πρὸ 15 μηνῶν δὲν δύναται νὰ γύη μὲ πολλὰ ἀπάδας ἐπιτυχίας, τούτων ἔχει ὡς ἀσφαλές καὶ βέβαιον ἀποτέλημα τῆς ἐκτος μάχης διάδεσις μεγάλου ἀρείμου ἄνδρων, χωρὶς νὰ κατορθωθῇ ὦ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ περιο-
Συνταγμάταρχην Δελαγραμμάτικαν, Χίον.

Τμήματον κρυπτογραφικόν τηλεγράφημα καὶ ἐκθέσεις ἀποσταλέντα διὰ λοχαγοῦ Κούβελης, ὡς καὶ πληροφορίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐξήγησες, ἐπειδή ἡμᾶς νὰ ἀναστέλλωμεν προσω-

Διαταγὴ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

1. Ὁ ἑφόρος ἀνερχόμενος κατὰ πληροφορίας εἰς 1500–1800 ἀνδρὰς περίπου ἐντολὴν ἐδῶκεν ἐν ἐκτεταμένω χώρῳ, ἐκτείνομένῳ ἀπὸ Πηλικιού ὑπὸ τῶν ὑψομάτων βορέως καὶ βορείοανατολικώς τοῦ Πυτιοῦ, καὶ κατέχει
πάσας τὰς πρὸς νότον τῆς γραμμῆς ταύτης κορυφὰς μέχρι τοῦ ὅροποδού Βρουλία περίπου. Αἱ μεγαλύτεραι τῶν συνεκτροσίας εὑρίσκονται κατὰ πληροφορίας ἐπὶ τῶν κορυφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Αἴπους μέχρι Ἀμυθύντους.

2. Ὅστε κατὰ τὴν 19 Δεκεμβρίου, συμπαρατάσσοντας καὶ πάνω τῶν θελοντικῶν σώματων καὶ τοῦ στόλου.

3. Τὸ ἀποστασμάτικον Παπαρρόδου, συγκεκριμένον ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ τάγματος 7ου συντάγματος, 4 πυροβόλου καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθυπολοχαγῶν Δόπης σώματος θελοντικῶν μετὰ διμορίας, ἔπειθεν ὑπὸ τῆς Βρουλίας, Σαλακόπουλου, Κουμάρου πρὸς Προβάτου ὅρους. Τὸ σώμα Δόπης ἔπειθεν ἐκ τῆς γραμμῆς Δεσπού-Ανώνυμα πρὸς τῆς γραμμῆς Σαλακόπουλο-Κουμάροι.

Ἡ ἐπίθεσις δὲν ἔστω ὅροι δαιμόνια ἑρμήνετον τῆς 7ης τῆς πρωί ὅτι της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου.

4. Μία διλοχία τοῦ ἀνεξαρτήτου ἐμπέδου τάγματος ὑπὸ τῶν ταγματαρχῶν Παπαδημητρίου, ὑπὸ τᾶς διαταγῆς τοῦ ὅπως τίθεται τὸ σώμα προσκόπων Παφλίδων, θὰ τήρῃ κατὰ τὴν πρωί τῆς 19ης τῆς γραμμῆς ἄγος Ἰοάννης-Καρυλντ-Παφλίδα καὶ ἐπιθετικῇ τῆς κατάληψις τῆς γραμμῆς μονὴ Ἀγίων Μάρκου, μονὴ Ἁγίων Πατέρων, εὐθὺς ὡς ἔπεντεν τῷ ἑκτροφῇ δυνάμεις χαλαρωθῇ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπιδράσεως τῆς πορείας τῶν κυρίων δυνάμεων τοῦ ἐπιτροπωτῆ Κατοχῆς.

5. Ἡ κυρία δυνάμεις τοῦ ἀπόστασμα ἀπαθητικοῦ ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων Ζέρβα, Κουβέκη, Μανουσάκη, τοῦ λόχου τῶν εὐξώνων καὶ τοῦ πυροβολικοῦ ἐκ προελάπῃ ὡς ἔλεισ.

(a) Τὸ εἰς Βρούταδο τάγμα Ζέρβα μετὰ δύο πολυβόλων τὰ ἐκκινήσει τῆς 6ης πρωί ἔκαμεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτητῆς ὅδοι Δίπους ἔκαμεν ἐκ πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν λόφων, ὡς κατειστὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Δίπους ἀνακλῆσεως, ἐπὶ ὅλη γάρ ἐπιτύχαντε διαταγῆς. Ἡ προελάπῃ τὰ ἐποικισθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν στόλου.

(b) Τὰ λοιπὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν προμηθεύσεως τάξεως διαταγῆς, τὸ πυροβολικὸ ἐκπομονοῦ τοῦ τάγματος Κουβέκη, ἔκαμεν ἐκ τῆς 6ης πρωί ἔκαμεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Χιών καὶ ἔκαμεν ἐκπομονοῦ εἰς Βρούταδο, ἐπὶ ὅλη γάρ ἐπιτύχαντε διαταγῆς.

Τὰ μεταγωγικὴ μάχης τῶν ταγμάτων ἐκ ἀκολουθήσεις τῆς υφήλιας κατὰ τὴν τάξεως τῶν πορείας καὶ ἔκαμεν ἐπὶ τὴν καταλήψη με τὴν καθήλωσιν τῶν εἰς τὴν πρὸς Αἴπου ἐξουδοῦ τοῦ χωρίου Νοτίου Βρούταδος ἀναμένοντα περαιτέρω διαταγῆς.

6. Ἡ εἰς Δακάδα δυναμικὰ Πλαστήρᾳ μετὰ σώματος προσκόπων κατευθύνθη πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν υψώματος Σαρακίνα-Σιδέρικα. Ἡ ἐπίθεσις τὰ ἐξομήνια βραδύτερα τῆς 7ης πρωί τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου.

7. Ἡ υπὸ τᾶς ἀνθυπαπαστήτης Σταρόμαν μικρὸν τχμία ὁπλίτων καὶ προσκόπων, εὐρυσκόμενοι εἰς Καρδάμιλα, ἐκ πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ ἀπενεργοῦ ὅπως Πυρότου υψώματος Καρφοτοῦ ἐξομήνια τῇ ἐπίθεσις τῶν σύμμαχων ἑκτροφῇ τῆς 7ης πρωί ἐκπομονοῦ ἔκαμεν τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου. Ἡ προελάπῃ τῶν υποστηρίχθησαν καὶ ἔκαμεν τοῦ στόλου.

8. Εἰς λόχος τοῦ ἀνεξαρτήτου ἐμπέδου τάγματος μετά τοῦ ταγματάρχου Κατούλα τα ἀποβιβασθῇ ἐκπομονοῦ τῆς 18ης Δεκεμβρίου εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον Βίκι. Ὁ λόχος οὔτε μετὰ τῶν σώματος προσκόπων τῶν ἐν Βίκι καὶ Ἀμάδας εὐρυσκομένων ὁμαλραχγών Ἐμίρης Ἰζοράκτης, Φωτάκης καὶ Μπριζσολάκης, τιθεμένων ἀπαντῶν ὑπὸ τᾶς διαταγῆς τοῦ ταγματάρχου Κατούλα, ἔκαμεν ἐκπομονοῦ ἐκ Βίκι καὶ ἐκ πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ Κρητικόλακκου καὶ τῶν υψώματος τῶν ἐπικρατοῦν τῆς Αμυθύντου. Ἡ ἐπίθεσις
9. Το είς Βολιοσόν μικτὸν τμήμα Γαββαθά εξ ὀπλίτων καὶ προσκόπων (Ἰκαρίων, Κρήτων καὶ Βολισισίων) θὰ διευθυνθῇ διὰ Καταβάσεως πρὸς κατάληψης τῶν δυτικῶν τοῦ Άγιον Ισιδώρου υψωμάτων, θὰ προελάτη δὲ κατόπιν πρὸς Όρος, όταν ἴδῃ τὴν κυρίαν φάλαγγα βαδίζονταν πρὸς βορράν.
10. Ἡ συνεγχέρσια πυρομαχικῶν θὰ εὐρύσκηται εἰς Νότιον Βροντάδο.
11. Θὰ βαδίσω μετὰ τῆς κυρίας δυνάμεως.
Pληροφορίαν ἀπὸ τῆς 7,30′ πρωινῆς ὥρας τῆς 19ης Δεκεμβρίου εἰς Βροντάδο.
Χίος, τῇ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912.
N. Δελαγραμμάτακας,
Διοικήσεως στρατού Κατοχῆς.

[26] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL OFFICERS commanding Units under his command.
Διοικήσεως στρατιωτικῶν τμημάτων.
Ἀναστέλλω τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῆς υπὸ σημερινῆς ἡμερο-
μηνίας διαταγῆς μου περὶ ἐπίθεσιν τῶν στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς
μέχρι νεοτέρας τοιαύτης. Συνεπῶς μὴ ἐπιχειρήσητε
αὐρίων τῆς 7ην ὥραν πρωίας κατὰ τὸν ἔχθρον, ἀλλὰ νὰ
παραμείνετε εἰς τὰς θέσεις, ἃς κατέχετε.
Χίος, τῇ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912, ὥρα 7η ἔσπερας.
N. Δελαγραμμάτακας,
Διοικήσεως στρατού Κατοχῆς.

[27] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.
[Ἀριθ. 723]
Ὑπουργείου Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθῆνας.
Ἐπίθεσις κατὰ τούρκικοῦ στρατοῦ διετάχθη διὰ τὴν

MILITARY DISPATCHES AND ORDERS

19ην τρέχοντος. Σήμερον 18ην μετὰ μεσημβρίαν, διοικη-
τής τουρκικῶν στρατευμάτων ἀπέστειλε δύο ἄξιωματοικοὺς
πρὸς συνήτησιν διὰ παύσιν ἐχθροπατείας. Αὐτοὶ δια-
ταγήν ἐπιθέσεως καὶ ἀυρίων μεσημβρίαν 19ην συνήτησι-
σονται ὡς παραδόσεως καὶ υπογραφήσεται πρωτόκολλο.
Παρακαλῶ διατάξατε τάχιστα πολίτες ἀρώματα, ἵκους
ἀν θὰ τοῖς ἀφεθῶσι τὰ ὀπλα καὶ ἃν δυνατὰ εἰς ἀναφερο-
μένων Ἀσίαν.
Χίος, τῇ 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1912.
Δελαγραμμάτακας,
Διοικήσεως στρατού Κατοχῆς.

LIEUT.-COLONEL ZICHNY BEY, Officer in command of the Turkish Troops, Chios, and Military Governor, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

Le 18 Décembre 1912. Major Hussein Loufti Bey, Commandant de la Gendarmerie à Chios, est nommé comme délégué pour la solution pacifique chez Monsieur le Commandant des troupes helléniques.

Commandant des Troupes Ottomanes,
Lieut.-Colonel d’État-Major Zichny.

COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding Troops of Occupation, Chios, to LIEUT.-COLONEL ZICHNY BEY, Officer in command of the Turkish Troops in Chios and Military Governor.

Chios, le 18 Décembre 1912.
Monsieur le Commandant de l’Armée ottomane,
En réponse à votre honorée du 18 décembre j’ai l’honneur de vous informer que de mon côté je nomme comme délégué pour discuter les détails et rédiger le Protocole le Capitaine d’Infanterie H. Kouvelis, Chef-de-Bataillon, et le Capitaine d’État-Major E. Bernardos.

Le Commandant-en-Chef des Troupes Helléniques d’Occupation, Delagrammatikas.
[30] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to ALL OFFICERS commanding Units under his command.

Διοικήτας στρατιωτικών τμημάτων.

Ή αναστολή τῆς ἐκτελέσεως τῆς χειμερινής διαταγής μου περί ἐπιθέσεως τοῦ στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς κατά τοῦ ἐγχειροῦ δὲν ἵσχυε. Συνεπώς αἱρόμην, 20ην τοῦ μηνός Δεκεμβρίου, θὰ ἀρχίσῃ τῆν ἐπιθεσίαν σας.

Χίος, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1912.

N. Δελαγραμματικάς,
Διοικητής στρατού Κατοχῆς.

[31] N. STRATOS, Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Ἀριθ. 6482]

Στρατιωτικῶν Διοικητὴν Χίου.

Εἰς περίπτωσιν παραδόσεως ἐγκρικοῦ στρατοῦ προσπαθήσατε, ὅπως αὐτὴ συντελεσθῇ ἄνευ εἰδικοῦ ὀρον παραμονῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀξιωματικῶς ὡς αἰχμαλώτων εἰς Χίον, ἐὰν δὲ τυχὼν προβληθῇ τοιοῦτος ὦρος, τότε ἀναφέρετε ἀναμένουτες σχετικὰς διαταγὰς ἡμῶν.

Ἐν Αθήναις, τῇ 19-12-12.

Στράτος,
Ὑπουργός στρατιωτικῶν.

[32] N. STRATOS, Minister of War, Athens, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

[Ἀριθ. 104244]

Συνταγματάρχην Δελαγραμματικάν, Χίον.

"Ὅροις παραδόσεως δεχθῆτε ἔξης. Καὶ ἀνάγατον ὀρον ἀξιωματικοῦ μετενεχθῶσιν Ἀθήνας φέροντες ὁπλα των, ὀπλήται ἔσονται αἰχμαλώτοι πολέμου καὶ μετενεχθῶσιν

Ἐπείγον.

[33] COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios, to the MINISTRY OF WAR, Athens.

[Ἀριθ. 9312]

Ὑπουργείου Στρατιωτικῶν, Ἀθήναις.

Συνεννοήσεις περὶ παραδόσεως δὲν ἐπέλεγχοσαν, διότι ἡ τούρκος ζητοῦσιν ἀπόλθωσι μὲ ὀπλα καὶ ἐφόδια. Δύρων προὶ ἀρρίζει ἐνέργεια ἐπιθετική.

Ἐν Χίῳ, τῇ 19-12-12.

Δελαγραμματικάς,
Διοικητής στρατού Κατοχῆς.

[34] MAJOR PAPADIMITRIOUI, Officer commanding the Independent [34]

Depot Battalion, to COLONEL N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS, Officer commanding the Troops of Occupation, Chios.

Καρναι, τῇ 20-12-912, ὁρᾶ 4,30’ µ. µ.

Κύριον Διοικητὴν στρατοῦ Κατοχῆς.

Ταύτην τὴν στιγμὴν ὁρᾶ 4,30’ µ. µ. ἀφίκετο κήρυξ ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ ἀρχιγιου τῆς τουρκικῆς χωροφυλακῆς, ὡστὶς διεπαραμεμεθῆ ἡµῶν προθέσεσι τοῦ ὀρον παραδόσεως, καὶ μοι ἐνεγείρισε σημείων, δι’ ἃς καθιστο τοὺς γνωτον ὅτι εἶναι ἐσόμαι ν’ ἀποδείξῃ τὴν παραδοσίαν συμφώνως μὲ τοὺς υψή ύµῶν τεθέντας ὀρος. Ἀναμένω διαταγὰς σας.

Ὁ Διοικητὴς ἀνεκδοτοῦ ἐμπεδοῦ τόγματος
Παπαδημητρίου,
Ταγματάρχης.
DOCUMENTS

PART II

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(b) INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE PROCLAIMING THE REVOLUTION IN CHIOS IN 1922 AND ADDRESSED TO ALL UNITS UNDER THEIR COMMAND
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II

(a) EXTRACTS FROM DISPATCHES RELATING TO THE CHIAN REGIMENT 1917–1918

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποστάσματος

'Ἡμερησίας Διαταγής τῆς 14ης Αὔγουστου 1917.
Συγγχαίρω τὸν 120ν λόχον διότι χθες κατὰ τὸν βομβαρ-
dιαμόν τοῖς τομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑχθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, δια-
tαχθέντες κατέλαβον τὰς θέσεις ἀμύνης αὐτῶν, παρὰ τὴν
θύελλαν τοῦ σιδήρου ἣτις ἐκάλυπτε τὸν ἀνωτέρω τομέα,
ἐν ἀκρᾳ τάξει, συνοχῇ καὶ ψυχραιμίᾳ. Διὰ τῆς διαγωγῆς
tῶν ταύτης, ἐπροκάλεσαν τὸν θαυμασμὸν τῶν Γάλλων
Ἀξιωματικῶν.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποστάσματος

'Ἡμερησίας Διαταγής τῆς 16ης Αὔγουστου 1917.
Κουρσανώ κατωτέρω τὴν ύπ’ ἀριθ. 516 Διαταγήν τοῦ
αὐτοῦ Στρατηγοῦ συγχαίρων καὶ αὐθείς τοὺς ἔτι τὴν ἀπὸ
14 τρέχ. Η. Δ. μοῦ μημονευθέντας στρατιώτας τοῦ 11ου
λόχου, διότι ἠξιώθησαν τῆς τιμῆς να μημονευθῶσιν ἐν
τῇ Διαταγῇ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς 76ης Πολεμικῆς Μεραρχίας, καὶ
προτείνω αὐτοῖς ὡς παράδειγμα μημήσεις εἰς τοὺς ὀπλίτας
tῶν ἀποστάσματος εἰς δοθησομένην αὐτοῖς περίττωσιν,
περὶ τοῦ ὁποίου ἔλμα τελείως πεπεισμένος.

Διαταγὴ ὑπηρεσίας

[516–26–8–917]
Ὁ Στρατηγὸς Διοικήτης τῆς 76ης Μεραρχίας ἐκφράζει
τὴν εὐαρέστειά του διὰ τὴν δείχθεσαν ζωήρότητα καὶ ὑπὸ
tῶν Ἑλληνικῶν στρατιώτων καὶ τῶν Γαλλικῶν τοῦ 227ου
Συντάγματος Πεζοῦ ἀυτοὺς ἐπηρεάσθην εἰς τὰς γραμ-
μάς μας πολεμικῶν ὑλικῶν καὶ τὸ πτῶμα στρατιῶτου
Γάλλου τοῦ 305ου ἀποικικοῦ Ἐνν./τος. De Vassart.
Αντίγραφον Άποστάσματος
Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τος τῆς 22ας Αυγούστου 1917.

'Εκφράζω τήν πλήρη ευαρέσκειάν μου εἰς τοὺς ἀνδράς τῆς περιτόλου, εἰς ἥν ἔχει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ εὐαρέσκειά του Στρατηγοῦ Διοικητοῦ τῆς Ἰδρυμάτων Βασιλείας, 'Ποδεκ. Καράβας Παντελής, 'Ποδ. Λαπανάζης Ιωάν., Στρ. Καλογερᾶς Ιωάν., Στρ. Παπαγιάννης Θεόδ., οὐδὲ καὶ ὅνομαζο ὑποδεκανεῖς.

Αντίγραφον Άποστάσματος
Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τος τῆς 10ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Κατωτέρω κοινοποιώ νὰ ἔχει Άποστάσματα Η.Δ.Μ.Α. τῆς 5ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917 πρὸς γνώσιν.

Απόστασμα
Ημερησίας Διαταγής Μερ. Ἀρχιπελάγους 18 Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

'Αλβων ὑπ' ἄνω τῆς δια τῆς ὑπ' ἀρ. 10038 (12-7-1917) ἀναφοράς τοῦ θου Πεζικοῦ Συν/τος ὑποβληθέσαν ἐκθέσων τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 11ου Λόχου καὶ τὰς σὺν αὐτῇ προτάσεις τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ Τάγματος καὶ Συν/τος, ἐς ὅνα καταφαίνει ὅτι ὁ Δοξίας Γηλάβας Γεώργιος, ὑπηρετοῦ ἐς τοῦ 11ου Λόχου τοῦ Συν/τος τοῦ, κατὰ τὴν 13ην τοῦ μηνὸς Αὐγούστου ἐ. ἐτῶν ὅτε ὁ Λόχος ἐκτάτη τὰ Χαράκια τῆς Γραμμῆς εἰς τῶν δεξιῶν ὑποτομέα παρὰ τῶν ἅγιων βομβαρδισμῶν τοῦ ἑθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, οὕτως μὲ τὸ ὅπλαν αὐτὰ χειρὰς περιέχετο τὰ Χαράκια τῆς ἡμεσμοιρίας τοῦ, ὑπηραρχῶν τὰ φυλάκια καὶ εἰσέλθων πρὸ τῶν συμπληρωμάτων παρὰ τὴν ἅλαζαν τῶν ὅξου, ἀνέμενεν εἰς ὅπως ἀντιληφθῆ κηψῆς τοῦ ἑθρικοῦ.

Αντίγραφον Άποστάσματος
Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τος τῆς 13ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

'Ομοίως λαβὼν ὑπ' ἄνω ἄρ. 91, 92, 93 καὶ 94 ἀναφοράς τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 30ου ῼΤάγματος μημονεύων τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τήν ἐναντί αὐτῶν ἀξίαν μημονεύσεως πράξεως 120ος Λόχος. (1) 'Πολ. Κόνταρης Εμμ. (2) Λευτέριος Καραδήμητριον Ἰάσων. (3) Στρ. Βαλμάς Γεώργιος. (4) Στρ. Κύριος Ήλίας. (5) Στρ. Τραυματισμών Αποστολίδης. (6) Στρ. Τραυμ. Νεκτάριος Γεώργιος., διότι τὴν ἑπτά τρεῖς μηνῶν ἔσπευσαν ἀμέσως ὅπως παρασχώμε τὰ πρῶτα βοηθείας εἰς τὸν θανατώμον πληγηθέντα στρατιώτην Ξενάρπουλον Ξανθάν, ἀσφαλείας τὸν κυνίσδον ἐκ τῶν τυρων τοῦ ἑθρικοῦ πυροβολικοῦ, ἐξακολουθητικά καὶ μὲ ἐναστέως βάλλοντας κατὰ τῷ σημείῳ ἑκείνου. 'Ιδιαίτερος μημονεύων τὸν στρατιώτη τραυματισμὸρεά Αποστολίδην 'Ιωάν. παραμένεντα ἐπὶ ἀρκετό πλησίον τοῦ τραυματίου μέχρι ὅτου κατάρθωσε νὰ τὸ παράσχῃ ὅλας τὰς δυνάμεις πρῶτα βοηθείας.

Αντίγραφον
Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τος τῆς 15ης-9-1917.

Κατωτέρω κοινοποιώ νὰ ἔχει ἐπιστολή τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 227ου Συν/τος 'Αντισυντάγματα/χοῦ Saint Hillier.

Πρόσ
Τὸν Ἀντ/Χυνο κ. Τσέρουδιν Νικολ., Διοικητή τοῦ 6ου Ἑλλ. Συν/τος.

'Εγκαταλείπων τὴν Διοικήσια τοῦ δεξιου ὑποτομεά, ὁ 'Αντισ/Χυνο Saint Hillier λαμβάνει τὴν τιμή νὰ παρα-
καλέσει τον Ἀντισ/χην κ. Τσεφούλην Νικόλ. ὅπως εὐαρεστοῦμεν χαιρετίζηκε ἐκ μέρους τοῦ κ. Κ. Ἀξιωματικοῦ Τσαζ/κού καὶ στρατιώτας τοῦ Συν/τός του, 1ου, 2ου καὶ 3ου Ταγμάτων διὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπολογίαν τῶν συνδρομην ἠν τῷ ἐπιδημίας ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῆς Διοικησῆς τοῦ.

Ἀπαντεῖ ἀμφότεροι πρὸς τὰ Γαλλ. Στρατεύματα κατὰ τὸ ἐκτέλεσιν περιπολίας ἄνδρεων τόσων, ὅσον καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τῶν ἐργασιῶν.

Ὅτι ἐχθρὸς δυν έχουμεν ἀπεναντία ἡμῶν ἡματωποῦνε. Δέον μετ’ ὁλογὸν νά εὐνοηήσῃ ὅτι δὲν δύναται νά μάχηται ἐναντίον μας.

Τὴν ἡμέραν καθ’ ὑπὸ δολοῦ Ἑλληνες καὶ Γάλλοι θὰ ἐπιτεθῶμεν τελευτικῶς δέον οἱ Γερμανοὶ καὶ οἱ Σύμμαχοι τοῦ νά μᾶς ἀφήσωμεν έλευθεράν τὴν διόδον.

Τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην τὰ ένει εὐτυχεῖς τὸ 227ου Σύν/μα νά ἐχθρὸν παραπλεύρως τοῦ τῶν γενναίων ὑπὸ Πεζ. Ἐλληνικῶν Σύνταγμα.

Πρὸς Τμάς ἐπίσης, Συνταγ/χα μου, ὑποβάλλω πλήρεις τὰς εὐχαριστίας μου διὰ τὰς πολλὰς συνδρομὰς, ἂς μοι ἔχετε παράσχει καὶ τελευτῶν ἀναφανῶ.

Ζήτω ἡ Ἑλλάς! Ζήτω ἡ Γαλλία!

Ἀντίγραφον

'Ἡμερήσιας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 19ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1917.

Δαβδών ὑπ’ ὁδεῖ τὴν ὑπ’ ἀριθμ. 69 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπτην τῆς ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 11315/1015 ἐπίσης. Διαταγῆς Μ. Α. Ἀναγράφον τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὰς ἄς ἐξετέλεσαν πράξεις ἁξίας μηνυμονεύσεως.

'Ο Ἐφεδ. Άνθ/τρος κ. Μπιλιάρκης Δευν., διότι κατὰ τὴν 24ης π. μ. ἐξετυμενέν ἐπὶ τότου ὅπως παράσχῃ τὰς πρώτας βοηθείας εἰς τὸν ἑαυτόπολος πληγωθέντα στρατιώτην 12ου Δόχου Ρουσσάκην Πλούταρχον ἐπιδείξασεν ψυχραιμία καὶ αὐταπάρνησιν, καθ’ ὅσον τὸ μέρος ἐνθα ἐπληγώθη ὃ ὅς

DISPATCHES RELATING TO THE CHIAN REGIMENT

Εἴρηται στρατιώτης ἔβαλλεν σφοδρῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχθρον πυροβολικοῦ.

'Ομοίως λαβὼν ὑπ’ ὁδεῖ τὴν ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 41 (16-8-17) ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικητοῦ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπτην τῆς ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 11312/1612 ἔπως. Δ. Μ. Α. Ἀναγράφο τοὺς κάτωθι διὰ τὰς ἄς ἐξετέλεσαν πράξεις ἁξίας μηνυμονεύσεως.

1. Άνθ/τρος Καρούζον Ιωάν., διότι διμορίης ἀν ἐκάρτησε διὰ τῶν ἅρρων καὶ τῆς ψυχραιμίας τῆς να παραλάβῃ τὴν διμορίαν ἐκ τούτων ἱσχυροῦ βαλλόμενου καὶ παραπόℓῃ τοῦ ἁρμός ἄρηφαλέστερος κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμὸν τῆς 12 π.μ.

2. Δοξιάν Μόσχαν Στάμ., διότι διασταθεῖς ἐν στήγῃ καταγιγμοῦ ὅπως τοποθετήσῃ σκοτών ἐν τούς χαρακώμαι τοῦ τομέως τοῦ κατόπτην ἀναγνωρίσεως, οὕτως ἀλήθεις πάντα κίνδυνον ἐξετέλεσε τὴν διαταγῆς ταύτην μὲ τὰ ἅρρων καὶ ταχυτητῶν.
3. Τὸν ὑποδεκ. Ζάρζον Γεώργ. διότι, ἀποκοπεῖσις τῆς διμορίας εἰς ἥν ἀνήκει κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμὸν τῆς 12 π.μ. ἐ. ἔ. λόγω μὴ μεταδόσεως τῆς διαταγῆς, οὕτως ἐσχέ τὴν πρωτοβουλίαν νὰ τοπθετήσῃ τοῦ ὑπολοίπου ἀνδρᾶς εἰς μέρη ἁσφαλῆς.

4. Τὸν ὑποδ. Κουνέλην Μιχαήλ διότι, καθ’ ἦν στιγμὴν ὁ ἀνωτέρω λοχίας Μόσχος ἐξήγησεν ἀνδρᾶς τῆς διμορίας τοῦ νὰ τοπθετήσῃ σκοποὺς εἰς τὰ χαρακόματα, οὕτως παρουσιάζοντο θεδουπών καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναμορίας τοῦ κατελάβα τὰς θέσεις παραμείνεις εἰκὲ καθ’ ἔλθε τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ βομβαρδισμοῦ.

5. Τοὺς ὑπό. Κοντοποδιάν Ἰωάνν. καὶ στρ. Γεωργιάν Αὐτών. διότι, κατὰ τὸν βομβαρδισμὸν τῆς 12 π.μ. χρησιμοποιηθέντες ὡς σύνδεσμοι, ἐπεδείξατο ψυχραιμίαν ἀπαράμελλον, διελθόντες διὰ μέρους ἱσχυράς βαλλομένου ἵνα μεταδώσωσι σαφῆς καὶ τάχιστα τὰς δοθείσας αὐτῶν διαταγὰς.

'Επίσης κατωτέρω κοινοποιοῦ τὴν ὑπ’ ἀρχ. 3040 Διαταγὴ τῆς Γαλλικῆς Μεραρχίας διὰ ἃς ἐξακολούθησε ὁ στρατ. Δράκος Δημ. τοῦ 11ου λόχου πρὸς γνώσιν τῶν ὑπ’ ἐμὲ.

'Ὁ στρατ. Δράκος Δημ. τοῦ 11ου λόχου δου Πεζ. Ἑλλήν. Συν/τος στρατιώτης ἀνδρευτότατος ὡς φονευθεὶς τῇ 13/26 Ἀυγούστου 1917 ἐντὸς τῶν χαρακωματῶν τῆς 1ης Γραμμῆς ἀναμένου ὑπὸ ἱσχυρότατον βομβαρδισμὸν τὴν ἐπίθεσιν.

'Ὁ Στρατηγὸς Διοικῆς τῆς Μεραρχίας μηνυμονεῖ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Διαταγὴν τῆς Μεραρχίας.

De Vassart.

Ἀντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

'Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 23ης–9–1917.

Δαβὼν ὑπ’ ὑμῖν τὴν ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 38 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος καὶ κατόπιν τῆς ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 11310/1610 ἐπισημ. Διαταγῆς Μ. Α. ἀναγράφῳ τοὺς κατοβί διὰ τὴν κατωτέρω πράξιν τῶν ἀξίαν μημονεύσεως. (1) Δεκ. Μουτάφης

DISPACHES RELATING TO THE CHIAN REGIMENT

Αντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

'Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 10ης–10–1917.

Δαβὼν ὑπ’ ὑμᾶς ὑποβληθείσαν μοι ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικήτου τοῦ 2ου Τάγματος προτείνων παρὰ τῇ Μεραρχίᾳ διὰ τὴν ἀπορρύμα τοῦ πολεμικοῦ Σταυροῦ εἰς τὴν ὁμογενείαν τοῦ ἀποθανόντος δεκακόσιον 70ου Δόχου Δεληγεώργης Μ.Χ., διότι κατά πληγωθεὶς ναυασίμοις κατὰ τὰς τελευταίας στιγμάς εἶχε τὴν ψυχραιμίαν νὰ ἐνθαρρύνει τοὺς ὑποστεότεροι τοῦ.

'Ομοίως λαβὼν ὑπ’ ὑμᾶς τὴν ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 799 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ Διοικήτου τοῦ 2ου Τάγματος ἐπαινοῦ τοὺς κατοβί ὑπὸ τῶν Δόχων. (1) Δοχίων Βοιωνίκου Ἰωάνν. (2) Στρ. Εὐθυμείδην Γ. (3) Στρ. Μπίζαν. (4) Στρ. Χατζαλέζην Τριαν. (5) Στρ. Ζανώκου Κονστ., διότι τὴν νύκτα τῆς 4–5 ἑτέρου περίπολον ἀποτελέσατε καὶ ἐξακολούθησαν τῶν συνατηγομέγατος ἐξέπλησαν τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῆς μετὰ θάρρους καὶ ψυχραιμίας.

Αντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

'Ἡμερησίας Διαταγῆς Συν/τος τῆς 30ης–10–1917.

Δαβὼν ὑπ’ ὑμᾶς τὴν ὑπ’ ἀριθ. 209 ἀναφορὰν τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος, ποιοῦμαι μεγείαν ἐξαιρετικῆν τοῦ Σαλπιγκτοῦ
Ημερήσια Διαταγή Συν/τος της 7ης-12-1917.

Διαταγή του Διοικητού του 11ου Λόχου και την έπος αυτής γνώμην του Διοικητού του 3ου Τάγματος, επιστραφείσης της ουτ' αρχ. 1080 αναφοράς 3ου Τάγματος, προωτείνως ὅπως ἀπονεμηθή ὁ πολεμικός Σταυρός εἰς τὴν ἀρχιγέννεις τοῦ φωνευόμενος στρατιώτου Δράκου Δημητρίου δία τοῦ ξίλου καὶ τὴν αὐταπάραστου ἐν ἐπεδείκται περὶ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν τοῦ καθήκοντος διατηρῶν πρὸς ἡ φωνεύσῃ τῆς θέσεως του ἐν ὀραματικοῦ βομβαρδισμοῦ μὲ τα ψυχραμίας καὶ γενναιότητος.

'Αντίγραφον Ἀποσπάσματος

ΧΙΟΥΣ ΛΕΒΕΤΑ

'Ημερήσια Διαταγή Συν/τος της 22ης-12-1917.

Ωμοίως λαβόντων ὑπ' ὁψιν ἐκθέσεων τοῦ ἀνωτέρω λοχαγοῦ κ. Πλαστήρα Νικολάου προς τῷ Μεραρχία ὅπως ἀπονεμηθή ὁ πολεμικός Σταυρός εἰς τὸν λοχαγὸ Χειλᾶν Ἰωάν., διότι κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτέρω βομβαρδισμὸν τῆς 1ης τρέχ. καὶ καθ' ὅλην τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦτον ἀρχιγέννεις ὡς διερμηνεύσεως παρὰ τῷ Γάλλῳ 'Τπολ/γού κ. Ἀντιμιτράτης ἐξέτασε πιστῶς πάσαν ἐνόημον ἀνατεθείσαν ἀυτῷ παρὰ τὸ ἀνωτέρω 'Τπολ/γοῦ, συνεργότας εἰς τὸ νὰ τεθῶσιν οἱ ἀνδρεῖς ἐκτὸς κινδύνου διὰ τῆς ἐκθέσεως ἀυτοῦ εἰς προφανὴ τοιούτων.

'Αντίγραφον

ΧΙΟΥΣ ΛΕΒΕΤΑ

'Ημερήσια Διαταγή Συν/τος τῆς 8ης-1-1918.

Ἀντίγραφον Π.Δ. τῆς 16-12-17 τοῦ Πολ. Συν/τος.

'Επιστραφείσης τῆς υπ' ἀρχ. 13019 ἀναφοράς μοι, τὸν ὑποδεκ. Μουτάφην Στύρ. διὰ τοῦ Λόχου προωτείνως πρὸς
Αντίγραφον

"Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τοσ τής 3ης-10-1917.

Δαβδων υπ’ οφν την υπ’ άριμθ. 788 υποβληθείσαν ιοι αναφοράν του Διοικητού του 2ου Τάγματος, αναγράφω τους κάτωθι ὄπλητα 7ου Δόχου διὰ τήν κάτωθι πράξειν ἄξιαν μνημονεύσεως:

(1) Δοξίαν Πέπαν Ἰωάν. (2) Δεκαν. 'Αγγελίδην Σωτ. (3) Υποδ. Σαλάταν Ἐλευθ. (4) Στρ. Φωτεινόν Ἰωάν. (5) Στρ. Σεύνον Ἀντών. (6) Στρ. Δροσινόν Ἡρακλ. (7) Στρ. Κούφαλον Ξενοφ. (8) Στρ. Ψευδήθη Ἡρακλ. (9) Στρ. Καλόγηρον Μιχ. διότι κατά τῶν βομβαρδισμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχθρικου πυροβολικοῦ τῆς θέσεως εἰς ἣν διαμένει ὁ λόχος κατὰ τὴν 29ην παρελθ. καθ’ ἣν ἔχθρικη δόξα ἐκραγείσα ἐπὶ τοῦ σκεπάσματος τῶν ἄμπρε ἦς διέμενοι οἱ δεκαν. Δεληγεώργης Μιχ. καὶ στρατ. Μπουρδαμῆς Γρηγόρ., καὶ Μπουρδάνης Ἰωάν. κατεκρήμνισε τούτο καὶ κατεπλάκωσε τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ διαμένοντας, οἱ εἰρημένοι ὄπληται αὐθορμη- τως ἐκφεύγουσιν εἰς τόπον, καὶ τότε ξακολουθητικό εἶπε τοῦ ἔχθρικου πυροβολικοῦ, καὶ κατάρθησαν νὰ διασώσουσι μὲ προφανῆ κίνδυνον τῆς ζωῆς τοὺς δύο ἐκ τῶν συνα- δελφῶν τῶν, παρέχων οὕτω τραγικὰ παράδειγμα συνα- δελφικῆς ἀλληλεγγύης καὶ αὐτοπαραμυθέως.

Δαβδων υπ’ οφν την υπ’ άριμθ. 24ης-11-1917.

Αντίγραφον

"Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τοσ τής 24ης-11-1917.

Δαβδων υπ’ οφν την υπ’ άριμθ. 24ης-11-1917.

Δαβδων υπ’ οφν την υπ’ άριμθ. 24ης-11-1917.
Παναγιώτου Χ. (7) Δεκαν. Κουφαλέξης Δημ. (8) Δεκαν. Τσακάρης Χ. (9) Δεκαν. Χαλβατζής Αντών. (10) Στρ. Μουτάφης Σπύρ. (11) Στρ. Τσιμπούκας Νίκ. (12) Στρ. Σταμπουλής Δημ. (13) Στρ. Μαυρος Ιωάν. (14) Στρ. Μποντζάλης Α. (15) Στρ. Μαμούνας Α. (16) Στρ. Σιδεράκης Π. (17) Στρ. Γκουλμηχάλης Κ. (18) Στρ. Ανδρέου Παντ. (19) Στρ. Τσιμπνός Δ. διότι μετά θάρρους, προθυμίας και ενδεχομένως δεξιότητας, εμπέπεσαν τα καθήκοντα τους εις τήν υπηρεσίαν των περιπολίων πλησίασάντας τα εκθέτα παρακατώματα και συναποκομίθανες εκθέτα πολεμικά είδη. ‘Ομοίως λαβών υπ’ όψιν έκθεσιν του υπ’/γούν Κ. Σακελλάρης Διον. καὶ τήν ἐπ’ αὐτής γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητῆ τοῦ Σου Τάγματος ποιούμει μενεὰς ἔξαιρετικὴν διὰ τοὺς κατωθὲ ὑπλάτεις τοῦ Σου Λόχου. (1) Στρ. Μουτάφης Επ. (2) Στρ. Παναγιώτουλου Λ. (3) Στρ. Κοσσυφάκης Αι. (4) Στρ. Μουστούρης Βασ., διότι ο πρῶτος αὐθορμήτως ἔστεψε να εἰσδοτηθή τοῦ Διοικητῆ τοῦ Σου Λόχου, εἶτα ἐπιστρέψας μετὰ τῶν ἀλλων μετὰ μεγάλης προθυμίας καὶ προφανούς κινδύνου τῆς ζωῆς τῶν μετέφερσαν τοῦ τραυματισθέντα στρ. Ἀρβανιτάκης Ἰωάν., εις τῆς 1ης γραμμῆς τούτου όνομάξω ὑπόδεκανευ. ‘Ομοίως λαβών υπ’ όψιν έκθεσιν τοῦ Διοικητῆ τοῦ Σου Τάγματος, ποιούμει μενεὰς ἔξαιρετικὴν διὰ τοῦ Τσολ/γούν Κ. Σακελλάρης Διον., ὅστις παρὰ τοῦ κινδύνου εἰς διὸ ὑπέκατο διατρέχων ζωῆν λιαν ἐπικίνδυνων καὶ ἀκάλυπτων εἰς τῶν τόπων ὅπου ἐτραυματισθή ὁ στρ. Ἀρβανιτάκης Ἰωάν., ἐνεργήσας ὅτι ἐπεβαλλότο διὰ τῆς μεταφόραν τοῦ, δείξας ουτω ἀφοσίως καὶ ἀκρον ἐνδιαφέρον διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρᾶς τοῦ.

Ἀντίγραφον
‘Ημερησίας Διαταγής Συν/τος τῆς 1ης 1918 Φεβρουαρίου 1918.

Περὶ ἀπομονωθῆς τοῦ Πολεμικοῦ Σταυροῦ εἰς τὴν οἰκογένειαν τοῦ φωνεύσεως δεκακάθ Χωρετζή Χερωπίου. Ἀντίγραφον ‘Ημερησίας Διαταγής 7ου Συν/τος τῆς 6ης 2-1918.

Λαβών υπ’ όψιν έκθεσιν τῶν Διοικητῆ τοῦ Δομοκοῦ ὅσι καὶ τήν ἐπ’ αὐτῆς γνώμην τοῦ Διοικητῆ τοῦ 3ου Τάγματος, ἀναστάσης, διότι θάρρους καὶ θέλησιν ἐπεδείξατο καθ’ ὀλὴν τήν διάρκειαν τῆς ἐν τῷ Μετώπῳ ὑπηρεσίας τοῦ.
Το γεγονός ικανοποιεί με την αποκαλύψη της δεξαμενής που είχε βρεθεί στον ορυκτό της θέσης. Ο Χούμης, ο διοικητής της ερευνητικής ομάδας, είχε δείξει την ανθρώπινη επιφάνεια του λόγου, που είχε παρατηρηθεί στην περιοχή. Η ερευνητική ομάδα είχε συγκεντρώσει σημαντικά στοιχεία για την κατανοήση της δεξαμενής και της θέσης της.

Αντίγραφον Αποστάματος

'Ημερήσια Διαταγή της 15ης Φεβρουαρίου 1919

'Από στήμενο παραδώσεις της Ωικίκης του Συν/τος είς τον 'Αντιστάτη και τον Θεόφιλο.'
άναπλάσεως τῆς Πατρίδος δοκιμάζω την μεγαλητέραν
λύπην διότι ἀποχωρίζομαι προσφιλῶν συμπολεμοῦν.

Ἀπερχόμενος συναποκομίζω καὶ τάς ὁρατήτας ἀνα-
μνήσεις μιᾶς ἐνδόξου σειρας δράσεως τῶν ἀποτελοῦντων
τὸ Συν/μα τοῦ Ἀξιωματικῶν, ὑπαξιωματικῶν καὶ ὁπλιτῶν,
tῶν ὁποίων ἀι φυτογραφία τὰ ἀποτελέσαν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
μου ξηράς εἰκόνας ἄξιοβανμῖστον συμπολεμοῦν ἀρετῶν.

Δεν θα ἔπεθυμον νὰ ἀποχωρίσθω τοῦ Συν/τοῦ τοῦτοῦ
ἀλλὰ ἐνέκρυλθα ἄλλος ἐνθυμός ἁγῶν ὃτι μοι ἐπιβάλ-
λει νὰ προσφέρω τὰς υπηρεσίας μου ἐὰς ἄλλα σημεῖα.—
Ἐν τούτοις ἡ μόνη ἐπιθυμία μου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκλείψῃ οἱ
λόγοι, νὰ ἐπανέλθῃ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸ Συν/μα τοῦτο ἐν
μέσῳ τοῦ ὁποίου ἐδοκίμασα τὰς μεγαλητέρας συγκυρίσεις
καὶ εἰδα πραγματοποιοῦμενα τὰ ἐνθυπετέστερα πατριωτικά
όνεα.

Ἐκφράζω τὰς ἀπειρίως μου εὐχαριστίας πρὸς πάντα
tοὺς ἀξιωματικοὺς καὶ ὁπλίτας τοὺς βοηθήσασάς με εἰς τὴν
προταρασσεῖσθαι ἀξιωμάχον στρατοῦ τοῦ ἐργασθέντας
μοχθήσασται κυνωνίσασται ἐπὶ 16 μήνες εἰς τὸν χαρα-
κῶσας τοῦ ἐνθυμοῦσάς διὰ τῆς ἐπιμονῆς τῶν τὸ
σφοδρόν ἐπιθετικὸν πνεύμα καὶ τὴν ἀκατάβητον πρὸς τὴν
Νίκην θέλῃσην, ἀτιμα χαμαματοῦ ἐξειδικάδωσαν ἐν
ἡ μάχῃ τοῦ Σκράτος τοῦ ἐνδειαζόμενον εἰς τὴ καταδύσει τοῦ
ἐξθρόν τῆς πατρίδος ἀδάμαστον ὅρμην ἄντων θέλησιν
αιτίον ἑτοὺς διατρέχαται περὶ τὰ 200 χιλιόμετρα μέχρι
Πεσόδου ἐντὸς μιὰς ἐβδομάδος, διασχόρισασταν τὸ
ἐξθρόν ὅπως καὶ ἄν τοῦ συνήθησαν καὶ ἔμβαλλαται εἰς
αὐτόν διὰ τής πρωτοφανοῦς τῶν ταχύτητας καὶ ἀνδρείας
τοιούτων παντικόν καὶ τοσοτάτην ἡθικήν κατάπτωσις ὅπου
νὰ ἐπιβληθῇ παρ’ ἑνὸς Συν/τοῦ ἐξειδικευτικὸν ἀφοπλισμὸ
εἰς μίαν Βουλγαρικήν Μεραρχίαν ἦτα μετέφερε εἰς τὴν
ἀγρίαν πατρίδα τῆς τὴν κατασχυόν ἐν τὴν τρομηρὰν
ἀνάμυνῃ τῆς Ἐλληνικῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ ταχύτητας.

Καὶ ἴδη ὅπως τὸ Συν/μα τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ὅποιον οἱ πολε-

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μικρά ἀγώνες ἐληθῶν μέλει νὰ δρέψῃ τοὺς καρποὺς τῆς
ἐνδόξου δράσεως τοῦ εἰχόμεν ἐκ ἐκάθος ψυχῆς εἰς ὅσους
μὲν θὰ ἐξακολουθῆσαι νὰ ὅσιν μέλη τοῦ Συν/τοῦ ὅπως
ἐνυπηρέσω νὰ ἀποτελέσω μέρος τοῦ Στρατοῦ κατοχῆς
tῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας, εἰς ὅσους δὲ τὰ ἀπελεύσων εἰς τὰ
ἐστία τῶν, ὁπόσος ἐνυπηρέσω νὰ σκορπίσωσι εἰς τὰς
οἰκογενειάς τῆς τὴν ἐνυπηρέσω καὶ χαράν ὅπως ἐσκορπίσω
διὰ τῶν τιμίων ἀγώνων τῆς ἔλευθερίας εἰς τοὺς σκλη-
ρομένους ἀδελφοὺς μας.

Προσφέρω δὲ εἰς πάντα τοὺς ἀγαπητοὺς μοι συντρό-
φους ἀξιωματικοὺς ὑπαξιωματικοὺς καὶ στρατιώτας τῆς
πλέον ἐγκάρδιον καὶ ἀδελφικόν χαριτεμένον παρακαλῶ
πάντα ὅπως μετὰ σεβασμοῦ καὶ εὐλαβείας τηρῆσαν
αιωνίαν τὴν μνήμην πρὸς τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς νεκροὺς μας,
οἴνως διὰ τοῦ τιμίου τῶν αἵματος ἐπεσφάγησαν τὴν
ἐνδόξου δράσει τοῦ Συν/τοῦ εἰς τὸ παγκοσμίαν τοῦτο ἄγων
ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῆς ἔλευθερίας τῶν λαῶν.

N. Πλαστήρας,
'Αρταβομηχανήρχο.

(b) INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE REVOLU-
TIONARY COMMITTEE PROCLAIMING THE
REVOLUTION IN CHIOS IN 1922 TO ALL
UNITES UNDER THEIR COMMAND.

Σχέδιον 'Ενεργείας

I. Κατάλυσις Άρχων

Ἀμα τῇ κηρύξει τῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως παρὰ τοῦ Στόλου,
ἤτις τὰ λάβη χώραν τὰς προϊναὶ ωρα, τὰ τμήματα:
1. Φεσοπούλου (6200 Συν/μα Πεζικού) καὶ
2. Βεντήρη (2300 Συν/μα Πεζικού), θελοῦν κατα-
λάβη τὰ Στρατιωτικὰ Καταστήματα.
Τμήμα Φεσοπούλου θα καταλάβη :
1. Στρατιωτικῆν Διοίκησν,
2. Φουραρχείον,
3. Αστυνομία, καί
Τμήμα Βεντήρη θα καταλάβη:
1. Λιμεναρχείον,
2. Τηλεγραφεία (άγγλικόν καί έλληνικόν) καί
3. Παραλιάν.
Άι διοικήσεις τῶν Μεραρχείων θέλουσι καταργήσει όμως δραματομενει αιδικώς έντος τῶν Μεραρχείων. Τά μέτρα ταύτα θέλουσι ληφθῇ παρ' έπιτροπής εν ἐκάστη Μεραρχία.

II. Συγκέντρωσις τμημάτων.
Πάντα τα ἐν Χίῳ συγκεκριμένα τμήματα θα συγκεντρωθῶσι εἰς τό τοπό τοῦ καταυλισμοῦ τῶν ἀναμένοντα ὁδηγίας.
Εἰδικῶν σχέδιων παρουσιάσεως ἀξιωματικῶν ἐκτὸς μονάδων εἰς τάς ενταύθα μεραρχίας θέλει καταρτισθῇ προσεχῶς.
Γενικαὶ ὁδηγίαι.
Πάντες οἱ ἀντιφοροῦντες θέλουσι φυλακισθῆ. Πάσα ἀντιδρῶν θὰ τουφκείζεται ἐπὶ τόπουν.
Αἱ διοικήσεις θὰ καταργηθῶσιν, καὶ ὑποδείχησις εἰς αἱ ἀξιωματικοὶ θ' ἀναλάβωσι τὴν ἀρχήγιαν.

III. Σύνδεσμοι.
Εἰς ἐκάστης μεραρχίας νὰ ὁρισθῇ εἰς ἀνώτερος ἀξιωματικὸς ἡ λοχαγὸς ὡς σύνδεσμος παρὰ τῷ Κ. Πλαστῆρα Ν., πρὸς ὅπως ὁδηγοὺν.
Εἰς ἐκάστου συντάγματος τῆς μοίρας πυροβολικοῦ νὰ ὁρισθῇ εἰς ἀξιωματικὸς σύνδεσμος ὡς θα λαμβάνῃ ὁδηγίας παρὰ τοῦ συνδέσμου τῆς μεραρχίας.
Σχέδιων καταλύσεως τῶν Ἀρχῶν.
Πρὸς τά τμήματα τοῦ ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσαπολίου καὶ ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη:

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(a) Τμήμα ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσαπολίου.
Τοῦτο θὰ καταλάβῃ τὰ κάτωθι Στρατιωτικὰ Καταστήματα:
1. Στρατιωτικὴν Διοίκησιν,
2. Φουραρχείον,
3. Αστυνομίαν,
4. Μικρὸν τμήμα θέλει καταλάβη τὰς στρατιωτικὰς ἀποθήκες.

(b) Τμήμα ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη θα καταλάβη:
1. Τὸ Διμεταρχείον,
2. Τὰ Τηλεγραφεία ἀγγλικόν καὶ έλληνικόν,
3. Τὴν παραλιάν, ἐξασφαλιζόν τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν ἀποκαταστάσιν παντὸς μὴ ἀνήκοντος εἰς τὴν Ἐσπανάστασιν ἐκ τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν δύο λιμενοβραχίων χώρον.
4. Τοποθέτησις πολυβόλων εἰς ἐκαστον τῶν λιμενοβραχίων πρὸς παρεμπόδισιν ἑξόδου ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος Χίον παντὸς ἀπαλλοτρού.

Γενικαὶ ὁδηγίαι.
"ὢρα εἰδιστούσεσ τῇ 2ον (ἡ ἀρα ἐκρήξεως τοῦ Κινήματος).
Εἰδικὸς ἀμέσως θὰ βαδίστε πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὧν ἂν εἴδεικνυμένον μερῶν.
Ἀποστάσματα εἰδικά δέον νὰ ὁρισθῶσιν ἐκ τῶν προτέρων μὲ ικανον ἀρμάθων ἀξιωματικῶν. Δέον ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ν' ἀναγνωρισθῶσιν τά δρομολόγια παρὰ τῶν ἐπὶ κεφάλης ἀξιωματικῶν.
Εἶδρα Διοικήσεως ἀντισυνταγματάρχου Φεσσαπολίου τὸ Φουραρχείον.
Εἶδρα Διοικήσεως ταγματάρχου Βεντήρη τὸ Διμεταρχείον.
Εἰδικὸς ὡς περαιοθῆ ἡ κατάληψις ν' ἀποστάλωσιν ἀξιωματικοὶ σύνδεσμοι παρὰ τῷ Ἐπιτροπῆ τῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως εἴθα καὶ θὰ παραλείψουσιν.
Το κεφάλης των συνδέσμων αξιωματικούς όρισθήκει εν καιρώ.

Συγκέντρωση Τιμημάτων:

Όσα έν τον γενικό σχεδίω ορίζεται, τόπος συγκεντρώσεως ο χώρος του καταλυσμού έκάστης μονάδος.

Προκαταρκτική εργασία:

(a) Σχηματισμός έπιτροπής, ήτις θ' αναθήσει την διοίκηση εν τον ικανότερον αξιωματικού.

(b) Σχηματισμός μονάδων συγκεκριμένων στρατιωτών να όρισθη ο λόγος εις έκαστον προσκεκλημένων αξιωματικόν.

(c) Σχηματισμός μιάς πολύβολαρχίας τουλάχιστον κατα σύνταγμα.

(d) Σχηματισμός μιάς τουλάχιστον πυροβολαρχίας κατά μεραρχίαν.

(e) Έφοδοιασμός ή μάλλον ανεύρεσις ικανού άρμηνου κυβοτόπων πυρομαχικών.

'Εργασία μετά την κήρυξη του κινήματος:

'Η όρα τής έκρηξες του κινήματος θα κοινοποιήθη είς τάς διαφόρους μονάδας διά τῶν αξιωματικῶν συνδέσμων αυτῶν παρά τῇ 'Επιτροπή τού Κινήματος ή καί δι' απανθραίνεισ τις ισχύων διεθνών χωρών μετά τής 'Επιτροπής. Πάντως θά καθώς καθορισθή μετά τού κινήματος τού Στόλου. Ευθύς όσο έκραγή το λάθος, πά μεν κινείται μέτρα εἰς τά κάτωθι.

(α) Περιορισμός τῶν ύπόπτων αντιδράσεων. Φυλάξιμος τῶν αντιφορούντων. Τυφεκισμός άμεσος τῶν δεκάνων τάσεις αντιδράσεως.

(β) Οι διοικητέων τῶν λόγων καὶ ταγμάτων να συντάξεις τὰ τμήματα τῶν, ἐποιούνν ότις διά τήν εκτέλεσιν πάσης έντολης.

(γ) Νά ληφθοῦσι μέτρα ἀσφαλείας καὶ να χρησιμοποιοῦνται οἱ μάλλον ἐμπιστοί.
CHIUS LIBERATA

Θωρητον "Δήμων".

(a) 15 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διομάτια τῶν ἁρωματικῶν.

(b) 5 διὰ τὰ διομάτια σημαίνοντα καὶ ἀρχικέλευστων.

(γ) 5 διαμέρισμα υπαξιωματικῶν.

(δ) 10 διὰ τὸ ὀπλοπτάσιον.

(ε) 15 διὰ τὸ κατάστρωμα.

Εὐδρομὸν "Νάξος".

6 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ἁρωματικῶν.

Εὐδρομὸν "Τένεδος".

2 Ἀξιωματικοὶ.

II. Ἡ ἑπτά κεφάλης τῶν ὀμάδων καφενείων "Κέντρον"
λαχανὸς Παπαμαντέλος, ἐπὶ τὴν χρησιμεύσι τῆς υποστήριξι πρὸς κατάληψι τοῦ ἀντιτοπισμοῦ "Σφενδόνη".

"Ἀντιτοπισμοῦ "Σφενδόνη".

(a) 5 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ναυτῶν. Ἡ ὀμάς αὐτὴ ἐπιβιβασθεὶς προηγούμενοι ἔπι τοῦ τοπολοβολου "Δωρίς".

(β) 5 Ἀξιωματικοὶ διὰ τὰ διαμερίσματα ἁρωματικῶν καὶ υπαξιωματικῶν. Ἑπιβιβασθεὶς ἀπὸ τὴν ζηράν. Ὁ λαχανὸς Παπαμαντέλος ἔποιησε κεφαλή διὰ τὰς λεπτομερεῖς μετὰ τὸν υποπλοϊκό τοῦ Σκουφοπούλου. Σημείωσις.—Νὰ συντριβή εἰς τοὺς κ.κ. Ἀξιωματικοὺς καὶ ὀπλίτας ὄπως τηρήσουν ἁρωματικών στὰς πρὸς τοὺς συνάδελφους τῶν ναυτικῶν. Νὰ φροντίσωσι διὰ καλὸν τρόπον νὰ μεταπείσωσι ἢ ἔξωδεται αὐτοὺς. Πάντως δὲν πρέπει νὰ τοὺς διαφύγῃ ὅτι εἶναι ἐπαναστάτης. 'Ὅσανος νὰ ἔχουσιν ὑπὲρ ὅσει οὕτως ὅτι θὰ εὑρίσκονται καθ' ὅπως τὴν διάρκειαν τῆς ἀνεργίας ταύτης ὑπὸ τὸ τὰς διαταγὰς τῶν μεμνημένων ἁρωματικῶν τῶν ναυτικῶν. Παρ' αὐτῶν δὲ τὰ δίδονται ὁδηγία.

REPORT ON REFUGEES IN CHIOS

ΚΗΡΥΞΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ

Εἶναι 2α προϊνή του Σαββάτου ἡ όρα τῆς εἰνάρξεως τῆς ἐκεκτελέσεως τῶν διαταγῶν τοῦ γενικοῦ σχεδίου τοῦ κυνήγητος. 'Η διαταγὴ:

Πρὸς ἀπαντὰ τὰ 'Επαναστατικὰ Τμήματα.

'Ορα ἐκκρήξεως κυνήγατος . . . ἡ 2α όρα προϊνῆ τῆς 1ης Σεπτεμβρίου.

Σύνθεσις . . . Ἕλλας — συνθήκη.

Χίος, τῇ 10 Σεπτεμβρίου 1922.

'Η 'Επαναστατικὴ 'Επιτροπὴ
'Εθνικῆς Συνθήκης,

ὁ Ἐπιτελάρχης
Σ. Μπακρέτζης,

πατ. Παρματέντης,

ταμ. Παρματέντης,

Κομισάτος.

Τίθεται εἰς ἐθερμομοιών ἦς Ἐπανάστασις ἐκηρύξθη.

(c) REPORT OF B. KRIMPAS, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL COLONIZATION, SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF THE REFUGEE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION.

LE PROBLÈME DES RÉFUGIÉS À L'ÎLE DE CHIOS

Introduction. L'île de Chio d'une étendue de 832 kilomètres carrés était habité en 1920 par 63,235 habitants. Parmi ces familles il y avait à peine 250 familles de Musulmans qui ont quitté le pays.

Plus de la moitié de l'étendue de l'île comprend des montagnes et des rocs incultes et nus. Le reste comprend des forêts de pin, des terres de pâturage et des terres cultivables. Les marais se chiffrent par 15,000 stremmas.

Agriculture. L'île de Chio est un district agricole.

On estime à 86,000 les stremmas cultivés
46,000 les jachères
180,000 les pâturages
100,000 les forêts
6,000 les oliveraies

SISMANOGIO
La production de l'île est indiquée dans les tableaux suivants :

**Tableau indiquant en oesuses la production de l'île.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Produit</th>
<th>1921-2</th>
<th>1924-5</th>
<th>1925-6</th>
<th>1926-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blé</td>
<td>644,198</td>
<td>675,000</td>
<td>783,650</td>
<td>787,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orge</td>
<td>299,550</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>172,935</td>
<td>352,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miette</td>
<td>151,400</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>111,500</td>
<td>113,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoine</td>
<td>5,750</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12,150</td>
<td>10,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seigle</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haricots</td>
<td>9,170</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fèves</td>
<td>296,360</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>428,730</td>
<td>101,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pois chiches</td>
<td>74,800</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>106,586</td>
<td>401,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentilles, etc.</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>21,270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pommes de terre</td>
<td>251,550</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>135,950</td>
<td>305,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produits de jardins</td>
<td>590,440</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>372,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabac</td>
<td>133,010</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>474,682</td>
<td>451,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anisette</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanos</td>
<td>421,300</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>390,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzerne</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisins</td>
<td>102,300</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>99,950</td>
<td>118,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moût</td>
<td>112,350</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>120,050</td>
<td>66,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huile</td>
<td>552,508</td>
<td>478,600</td>
<td>814,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td>118,800</td>
<td>379,800</td>
<td>214,916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarines (pièces)</td>
<td>43,828,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>19,222,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td>20,142,500</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>8,974,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrons</td>
<td>1,179,500</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>2,449,000</td>
<td>49,951,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigarades</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastic (ocues)</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pommes</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poires</td>
<td>12,150</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>26,450</td>
<td>137,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figue sèches</td>
<td>123,250</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amandes</td>
<td>145,750</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>318,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroubes</td>
<td>222,500</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>233,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Il ressort de ces tableaux qu'il y a une augmentation croissante des récoltes des céréales, des légumineuses et en général des produits annuels, qui peut être certainement attribuée à l'augmentation de la population par l'élément réfugié agricole.

**Industrie.** L'industrie actuelle de l'île consiste :

1. Aux tanneries. Les peaux sont importées, ainsi que la matière contenant le tanin. Les peaux après la préparation sont exportées. Cette industrie est confiée aux mains des ouvriers indigènes, parce qu'elle exige des notions et de l'expérience techniques que les réfugiés ne possèdent pas encore.

2. Une fabrique de tuiles et briques de terre, nouvellement installée, qui occupe une cinquantaine d'ouvriers.

3. L'industrie de compotes et confitures renommées de Chio, donnant du travail à 50 ouvriers.


5. Un atelier (bonneterie) pour la confection d'articles en laine exportées partout en Grèce.

6. Une fabrique d'étoffes en coton.

L'exportation des produits agricoles et industriels et l'importation des différents articles, se fait par le très bon port de Chio, aux travaux duquel s'occupent, en proportion de 9/10, des réfugiés.

**Balance commerciale.** La production agricole et industrielle n'est pas suffisante pour couvrir les besoins d'importation. En 1926 ont été exportés des articles de

- 150,823,000 drs.

**Importé** 175,695,788 drs.

Exportation de 24,872,788 drs.

Par contre, en 1926, le change qui a été importé dans l'île était de £160,241 soit : 61,532,544 drs. (à 384 drs. par £).

De ce qui a été cité et des chiffres qui seront cités plus bas, il ressort que non seulement d'autres réfugiés ne devront pas s'installer, mais que ceux qui sont actuellement dans l'île se trouveront dans une situation problématique, si des mesures spéciales ne sont prises pour le développement de l'industrie, dont nous reparlerons.

**Réfugiés.** L'île de Chio, par suite de sa proximité à l'Asie Mineure, a servi de premier refuge aux populations chassées de l'Asie. Le nombre actuel de réfugiés paraît être le suivant : Dans la ville de Chio 13,000 réfugiés. (La population de la ville était de 20,032 en 1920 ; elle monte, selon les renseignements fournis par le maire, à 33,000 habitants.) 4000 réfugiés, en chiffre rond, sont dans les autres villages de l'île. En tout cas, on peut se baser sur 18,000 à 18,500 réfugiés, soit 4300 à 4500 familles, en chiffre rond.
De ces 4 500 familles, les 1 700 étaient des familles d'agriculteurs. A présent, toutes celles qui restent dans la ville ne le sont plus et on peut se baser sur 1 000 familles agricoles. Les agriculteurs étaient ainsi répartis :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localité</th>
<th>Nombre de familles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dans la ville de Chio et environs</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampochora (villages de la plaine)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kardamyta</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volissos</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oenoussai-Psara</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masticchochora (villages de production de mastic)</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

De ces 900 familles qui restent dans la ville de Chio et aux environs, les 600 sont venues des urbains. Il faut excepter une centaine qui sont aux environs et celles qui ont été établies dans les jardins et dont nous reparlerons.

Au point de vue d'habitation, les réfugiés, dans la ville de Chio, sont ainsi répartis :

Dans la forteresse, la Banque possède 272 immeubles dans lesquels elle a casé 786 familles et en ville elle possède 496 immeubles, dans lesquels elle a casé 536 familles de réfugiés. Soit en tout 1 032 familles. A mon avis, les réfugié existant actuellement à Chio sont ainsi répartis :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localité</th>
<th>Nombre de familles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dans la forteresse (maisons musulmanes)</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En ville</td>
<td>(                   ) 536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartier de Vardatsi</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Limni</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dépôts et maisons réquisitionnées</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisons à loyer</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 729

Pêcheurs et familles hospitalisées par d'autres familles 600
Total de la ville 3 329
Agriculteurs 1 100

4 429

Chiffre rond maximum 4 500 \( \times 4 \) = 18 000 personnes.

Des réfugiés habitant la ville, il y a 1 956 familles (soit 5 439 personnes) sans protecteur, parce que tous les hommes ont été massacrés. De ces 5 439 personnes, seulement les 2 000 sont des travailleurs. Les autres sont des enfants ou des gens incapables de travailler.

Il y a encore 800 familles de réfugiés urbains dont la plupart sont des médecins, des commerçants, des épiciers, des fonctionnaires, des chauffeurs etc.

Il y a à peu près 200 familles qui vivent du petit commerce, ayant construit de petites baraques, dans lesquelles elles ont installé de petits magasins.

On m'a assuré qu'il existe à Chio 200 familles de pêcheurs dont 20 seulement sont installées, les chefs de ces familles ainsi que les hommes pouvant travailler n'habitent pas la ville, mais pêchent autour de l'île Eubée. J'ai appris que les pêcheurs que la R.S.C. comptait établir à Skiatho sont de ces familles. Les autres membres de leurs familles habitent l'île.

**État sanitaire.** Les familles qui restent dans la forteresse et les dépôts se trouvent dans une situation affreuse, à tout point de vue. Les médecins de réfugiés m'ont certifié que 60 à 70% des malades sont tuberculeux. Tous les réfugiés habitant la forteresse et les dépôts souffrent d'une inflammation des yeux due à l'humidité excessive et à la fumée qui y règne, vu que les familles préparent leurs repas dans les dépôts.

**Indemnités.** Le Directeur de la succursale de la Banque Nationale m'a donné les chiffres suivants des indemnités qui ont été touchées par les réfugiés :

- En argent 28 874 649 drachmes touchées par 3968 personnes.
- En bons 115 798 000 touchées par 3968 personnes.

**Besoin en tout des réfugiés urbains.** Les représentants des réfugiés estiment que pour soulager les besoins des réfugiés de la ville, il faudrait construire :

1. 50 maisons pour l'association déjà constituée
2. 150 maisons pour des réfugiés de la catégorie A
3. 500 maisons pour des réfugiés de la catégorie B
4. 250 maisons pour des réfugiés de la catégorie C
5. 1 000 maisons
Catégorie A. Cinquante des réfugiés urbains (médecins, commerçants) ont constitué une association ‘ASTY’ dans le but de construire des maisons. Ils ont acheté déjà le terrain (du prix de 8000 drs. par membre) et demandent le secours de la R.S.C. Ils estiment à 5-6,000,000 de drs. les besoins en argent pour la construction. Ils disposent de 1,250,000 drs. Ils sont disposés d’acquitter leur dette en payant 500,000 drs. par an (voir leur requête).

Les autres 150 peuvent également payer de 10 à 15,000 drs. par an d’amortissement. Ils demandent un secours de 75,000 par famille. Ils sont disposés de verser tout de suite 25,000 drs. de façon à construire des maisons de 100,000 drs.

Catégorie B. La deuxième catégorie de 500 familles comprend ceux qui peuvent payer un amortissement de 4-5000 drs. par an, mais qui ont besoin de maisons de moindre valeur.

Catégorie C. Les 250 familles de la troisième catégorie ne peuvent rien payer. Pour celles-ci, qui d’ailleurs sont de celles qui vivent dans les pires conditions, l’État doit s’en occuper le plus tôt possible.

Les pêcheurs dont nous nous sommes occupés plus haut sont répartis comme il suit :-

- 50 dans la première catégorie,
- 100 dans la deuxième et
- le reste dans la troisième (les 20 familles sont déjà bien installées).

Terains à bâtir. L’association ‘ASTY’, comme il a été dit, a déjà trouvé le terrain nécessaire.

La R.S.C. a déjà choisi 2 autres terrains à bâtir. Le premier, situé au côté N. de la ville entre la route de Kardamyia et la rue Ste-Anne, de 37,970 m², appartient en grande partie à la Mairie de Chio, le reste appartenant à la Défense Aérienne. La situation est très bonne. La R.S.C. a également demandé l’expropriation d’un terrain appartenant à la veuve Pagiavla. Le terrain était destiné pour la colonie des pêcheurs. Il y a d’autres terrains à bâtir dans d’autres situations, moins convenables. Les meilleurs appartiennent à la Banque Nationale et quelques-uns à des monastères.

Marché. Comme il a été relatif, les petits commerçants de Chio (réfugiés) n’ont pas de magasins. La Mairie se propose de soumettre à la R.S.C. une proposition concrète.

Industries à développer. Dans le chapitre de l’industrie nous nous sommes occupés des réfugiés qui travaillent à Chio. A mon avis, on peut facilement trouver du travail aux veuves et aux jeunes enfants qui se sont trouvés à Chio. Une cinquantaine de familles de Kerkentéz et une cinquantaine de Alatztata, connaissent bien l’art du tapisser. Mais aucun industriel n’a été trouvé pour y installer une fabrique.

La totalité des autres familles savent très bien le tissage. Nous avons dit que 2 ateliers sont en fonctionnement donnant du travail à 100 ouvrières. Les installations faites ne sont pas suffisantes et les industriels donnent du travail aux veuves en maison.

Deux demandes ont été soumises par ces industriels ; l’une d’elles est signée par deux (qui n’ont pas installé d’ateliers) qui demandent des renforts économiques pour étendre leurs entreprises. Il y a à mon avis beaucoup à faire dans cette direction. On pourrait également envisager la question de la constitution d’une coopérative entre les veuves, mais il faudrait avant tout trouver la personne qui se chargerait de la direction des affaires.

Conclusion. Après l’investigation que j’ai faite sur le problème urbain à Chio, je crois que la R.S.C. devrait laisser au Gouvernement le soin de bâtir des maisons pour les réfugiés de la catégorie C et qu’elle devrait se charger de la construction pour les deux autres catégories d’un certain nombre de maisons que ses moyens lui permettront.

Le problème des réfugiés agriculteurs à l’île de Chio. Il y a, comme il a été dit, 1100 familles de réfugiés agriculteurs existant dans toute l’île de Chio. La propriété rurale, quittée par les Musulmans échangés, d’assez grande valeur, est de :

- 113 champs 829,30 str.
- 119 jardins 959,50 "
- 1,788,80 "

SISMANOGLO
Les 74 pièces d’une étendue de 489,84 str. ont été vendues pour 10,199,800 drs. (prix d’estimation 4,661,407). Dans ces domaines sont installés comme locataires :

(a) champs : 138 réfugiés sur 208 locataires.
(b) jardins : 92 " " 105 " "

230 " " 313 " "

Ces réfugiés étaient placés comme locataires, par le bureau d’échange, après mille difficultés. Car les indigènes s’y trouvant exploitent ces domaines de temps immémorial. Les Turcs enchaissaient un loyer et étaient des propriétaires de nom. Toute cette propriété musulmane se trouve autour de la ville de Chio. A l’intérieur de l’île, il n’y a pas de propriété musulmane.

La B.N. a exigé de la part des locataires le 5% de l’estimation faite par elle comme loyer. Les jardins sont vendus à de grands prix, en moyenne 40,000 drs. par stremma. Les champs 10,000 drs. Ce sont les indigènes qui les ont achetés.

Quelques familles de réfugiés, placées comme locataires, ont loué leurs parcelles aux indigènes. Il est à prévoir que quand les jardins seront mis en adjudication, elles seront achetées par les indigènes. En tout cas, les prix seront tellement haussés que les réfugiés ne pourront pas avoir de bons revenus. Ce n’est qu’en diminuant les prix que réfugiés et indigènes pourront rester avec profit dans ces domaines.


Il y a des terres appartenant à des monastères sur lesquelles on pourrait établir des agriculteurs. Le Directeur des services agricoles de l’île a déjà soumis des rapports au Ministère de l’Agriculture.
250,000 oceues. Les indigènes revendiquent ces terres comme leur propriété, et sont pourtant disposés de les vendre à très bon prix. Les réfugiés insistent qu’il s’agit de propriétés communales. Les petits îlots autour de l’île centrale sont la propriété de la Défense aérienne.

Une étude a été faite par le Directeur des Services Agricoles et soumise au Ministère de l’Agriculture. Je crois que la R.S.C. ne doit s’occuper de l’affaire que quand le Ministère la résoudra et si elle veut s’occuper de l’établissement agricole.

Si la R.S.C. compte entreprendre l’établissement agricole dans toute la ville, il faudrait une étude approfondie de toute la question agricole.

Le Directeur,
B. Krimpas.

(d) LETTER FROM GENERAL N. PLASTIRAS ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHOR.

Ευγενέστατε Κύριε Άργιντη,

'Η μεγάλη σας και μεγάλη μου άγαπη προς τὴν Χίον καὶ τοὺς Χίων ἐπιφθεῖναι τῆς εὐχαρίστου εὐκαρπίας νὰ πλουτίσουν τὸ νέον τοῦτο περὶ Χίου ἔργον μὲ τόν πανηγυρικὸν καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸν τῶν τιμήσαντος τὰ ὅπλα τῆς πατρίδος νεώτερον Χίου, τοῦ Χίου στρατιώτου.

Μακροι αἰώνες παρήλθησαν ἄφ’ ἄτοι ἔπαυσε ν’ αἰκόνεται τὸ ὅνομα τοῦ Χίου ἤρωμεν μὲ κλαγγίῳ ὅπλων. Βάρβαροι καὶ μακράι δουλεία ἐχει σβύσει εἰς τὰ ὅτα τῶν ἄτυχων κατοίκων τῆς πατρίδος σας τῶν γλυκῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τραχὺν ἄμα Χίου τῆς ἐνόπλου μουσικῆς. Τσάρες δὲ οἱ κατὰ καιροὺς πιστεύσαντες ὅτι ὁ Χίος, γνωστός εἰς τὴν παγκόσμιον ἁγοράν διὰ τὸ ἐπιχειρηματικὸν καὶ ἐμπορικὸν δαιμόνιον, θὰ ἦτο ὁ ὑποδειγματικὸς στρατιώτης. Οἱ τούτῳ φρονοῦσα, ἐν οἷς ὁμολογοῦν ὅτι ὁ Χίος ἦτο τέλειος καὶ χρηστός πολίτης, ἐλπισμόνοι ἐν ταυτῷ

Τὸ αξιόμα ὃτι εἶναι ἀδύνατον νὰ φαντασθῇ τις καλὸν πολίτην χωρὶς οὗτος νὰ εἶναι καὶ καλὸς στρατιώτης καὶ τάνασσαι, ἀξιόμα τὸ ὅτι οὗτος ἐπηλήθευσεν ὅτι τῶν ὑπότων διὰ πολλοτέρην ἔφοβαν περὶ τοῦ Χίου.

Ἀλλ’ ἀνέτειλε τέλος καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ εὐλογημένη, ἡ προβαίς τῆς 12 Νοεμβρίου 1912, καθ’ ἑν τὴν ἦσθαι οἱ φῶς τῶν ἀναπολικῶν ἀναγεννῶν αἱ νικηφόροι καὶ μεστά δαφνῶν λάγχα τοῦ ἀπελευθερωτικοῦ στρατοῦ. Ἡ Χίος ἀνέπτυχε ἀπλίκησις τῶν μυρωμένων ἐλεύθερον ἀέρα τῆς γλυκείας ἀτμόσφαιρας τῆς.

Ταχθεὶς νὰ μετασχηματίζει τῆς ἀναλαμβούσης τῆς ἐκπαιδεύουσι τῶν πρώτων ὑπὸ τὰς σημαίας προσβλήτων νεαρῶν Χίων ἀποστολῆς, ἦλθα εἰς τὴν Χίον τὸ 1914 καὶ εἰργάσθη κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πρόσκλησιν τοῦ 1916 τῆς προσωρινῆς Κυβερνήσεως τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης, καὶ διὰ τούτο δύναμαι νὰ εἰμί διὰ τὴν άλλην ὑποστήριξιν, εἰπερ τις καὶ ἀλλος, ἐγκυρὸν γνώμην περὶ τοῦ στρατευμένου Χίου, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ο στρατός εἶνε τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτό κουστονικό σχολεῖον καὶ τὸ χαλκείον πάστης κοινοτικῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐγνώρισα καὶ άξιοτίμονος καὶ πολλάπλας ψυχικάς καὶ πνευματικάς ἱδιότητας τοῦ Χίου.

Εὐρεθεὶς ἀπέναντι τοῦ κατὰ πρῶτον τασσομένου ὑπὸ τὰς σημαίας Χίου διέγνωσα αὐτὸν εὐφυή, εἱμβή, ἐνθουσιώδη, ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἐν τελεῖα ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ διατελοῦντα. Εἶδα ἑνα μεροφεωμένον καὶ χρησιμότατον εἶτα ὑπότην, ἴκανον καὶ έτοιμον νὰ προσφέρει τὰ πάντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας καὶ αὐτοπεποίθησεως. Τούτου τὸν εὐροτον πανταχοῦ καὶ πάντως—καὶ βεβαιώσω ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἔχον ὑπὸ τᾶς διαταγῆς μου Χίους, εἰς τὸ Μακεδονικῶν μέτωπων, εἰς τὴν Οὔκρανιαν, εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἁγίας—πρῶτον εἰς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, τελευταίον εἰς τὴν ὑποχώρησιν, τολμηρόν, σταθερόν καὶ φιλότιμον. Ἡ ἐκτίμησις μου πρὸς τὸν Χίον στρατιώτην βασιζέται ἐπὶ τῆς προσωπικῆς μου
Λέτε την φήμη αυτή κατά τον μεγάλον πόλεμον ἀπεδείχθη ὡς ἀνήκουσα εἰς τὴν μυθολογίαν. Πού ἡ σκιά, τοῦ ἡ ἱδέα τῆς φήμης περί ἀπολογίας τῶν Χίων; Ἕ εἰς τοὺς ἑπτάκος ἀγώνας τοῦ Σκέα καὶ τοῦ Πεστόβου; Ἕ εἰς τὸς ὁμηρικὰς τῆς Μικρᾶς Άσιας μάχας; Βεβαιός οὐδεὶς γεινάται ἡμῶς, ἀλλὰ γίνεται διὰ τῆς ἐξεισορκίας, τῆς ἀγνωσίας καὶ τῆς ἐκπαιδευόμενης τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν φιλοτήτων τοῦτων ἑρωών, ἐπικεφαλήων ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκουμενικῆς καὶ τῆς καθόλου τοπικῆς αὐτῶν ἀνατροφής, οὐδεποτὲ θὰ ἤδυναίτο ν᾽ ἀφυπνισθοῦν μὲ τόσον τελείωτην. Εἰς τοῦ στρατιωτικοῦ περιβάλλον τῶν Χίως ἐπάνω τὸ ἀντίκηρον ἀπεκαλύφθη ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ μεταφράσει τῆς θεαυρόν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ Χίων στρατιώτου. Εὐθύμοις, πρωτότυποι, δημιουργικός, ἀκαταπόνητος, καρτεροκός, ἀποδίδατοι, ἐξυπνοι, πατριώτης μέχρι φανατισμοῦ ἀνείρην ὅλη τὴν ἑπιστημονικὴν καθήκον τοῦ δύναμιν, μόλις ἀνέπνευσεν τὸν ζωογόνον ἀέρα τοῦ βούνου, τὸν ἀέρα ἑκείνου ποὺ ἐθέρμανε ἡ στήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ 1821 καὶ τῶν νεαρών συγχρόνων μας ἡρώων.

Καὶ δύναι καὶ εἰς ἐπὶ συντάκτως ὅτι ὑπήρχεν ὑποθετικός καὶ τὸ ἀπεδείχθη εἰς ὅλης τοῖς ἐκστρατείας καὶ τὰς μάχας, εἰς ὅτι ἦλθε μέρος, καὶ προσέφερεν ἐχθέντας εἰς τῶν βώμων τῆς πατρίδος αὐθαρρυτέος, ἀβίαστος, ἀγογυστῶς καὶ πάντες ἐν ἐπιγωνία τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπιδιωκομένου σκοποῦ. Οὐδέποτε ἄπεκαμε, οὐδέποτε ἀπεθανούσθη, ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἄγρυπνοι καὶ ἀκαμάτοι φρουρῶς τῶν ἐντόλων τῆς πατρίδος, ἐστῶ καὶ ὑποφέρων, πάσχον ἢ στερεθέας, ἀφροτός ὁμος τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ή ἐντολής τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ πληθυσμοῦ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἑποχῆς, ἄξιος ὁμηρικοῦ.